

Research Article

Russian Archives in Transition: Caught Between Political Crossfire and Economic Crisis

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Abstract: This article results from the author's experience in Russia during 1992, where, under IREX sponsorship, she was working collaboratively with the State Archival Service of the Russian Federation—Rosarkhiv (until the October 1992 presidential decree took effect in December 1992, the Committee for Archival Affairs of the Russian Federation—Roskomarkhiv), the State Public Historical Library (GPIB), and the St. Petersburg Branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences establishing a computerized database (ArcheoBiblioBase) for a directory and bibliography of finding aids for archives and manuscript repositories throughout the Russian Federation. In addition to the sources cited, coverage of many issues comes from a multitude of discussions with Russian archival leaders. Particular appreciation is due to the several friends and colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic who critiqued earlier drafts.

A slightly variant form of the present article appears as the introduction to *Russian Archives 1993: A Brief Directory, Part 1: Moscow and St. Petersburg*, Preliminary English Version, edited with an introduction by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted; foreword by Vladimir Petrovich Kozlov (Washington, D.C.: IREX, February 1993). A Russian translation of this article will appear in *Novaia i noveishchaia istorii*, 1994, no. 1. An earlier version of this text, together with prefatory commentary by Vladimir Kozlov, Deputy Chairman of Rosarkhiv, appeared in the July and September editions of that directory. The article continues the Grimsted series published in the *American Archivist* and distributed by IREX: Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, "Glasnost" in the Archives? Recent Developments on the Soviet Archival Scene," *American Archivist* (AA) 52 (Spring 1989): 214–36; see also comments by two Russian specialists in AA 53 (Summer 1990): 468–75, and the present director of the Estonian archives in AA 53 (Fall 1990): 576–81; Grimsted, "Perestroika in the Archives? Further Efforts at Soviet Archival Reform," AA 54 (Winter 1991): 70–95 (a pamphlet reprint is available from IREX; describes conditions in Soviet archives to

the end of 1990); "Beyond *Perestroika*: Soviet Archives After the August Coup," AA 55 (Winter 1992): 94–124 (an expanded preprint is available from IREX; continues the story to the end of 1991). See also the booklet, *Intellectual Access to Soviet-Area Archives: What Is to Be Done?* (Princeton, N.J., March 1992; IREX preprint).

The article remains as it was revised at the end of January 1993. Although the present version (15 September 1993) is edited slightly due to publication delays in the *American Archivist* (especially in regard to temporal references and a few factual errors), it does not take into account the important developments on the Russian scene in the subsequent months of 1993.

To be sure, revelations from declassified secret contemporary files continue. Scandals in connection with the sale of publication rights to sensational unclassified documents have occasioned the firing of most of the leadership and the closing for several months of the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documents (TsKhSD) at the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee headquarters at Staryi Ploshchad. Budgetary deficiencies forced most central archives to close for the month of August, and maintenance problems kept the elevators shut down in the stacks of the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF) for most of the year. A conservative parliament has held up the restitution of captured records. Most important, on a more positive note, on 7 July 1993 parliament passed the Law on the Archival Fond of the Russian Federation and Archives ("Osnovy zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob Arkhivnom fonde Rossiiskoi Federatsii i arkhivakh"), and it was subsequently signed into law by President Yeltsin, giving Russia its first comprehensive archival law in history. The new law replaces the series of Soviet-style decrees, but considerable opposition can already be heard about various provisions of the new law, especially the lack of respect for private archives. An initial decree of implementation—"On the Realization of State Policy in Archival Affairs" ("O realizatsii gosudarstvennoi politiki v arkhivnom dele"—*Postanovlenie SM RF*)—was issued by the Council of Ministers on 23 August 1993, and additional plans for implementation are being drawn up. Economic and administrative remedies to other archival problems are still being considered. The Presidential Archive is being moved to Staryi Ploshchad, while controversy continues about the extent of transfer and access that will be possible to KGB files of various categories. Discussion of these and other developments on the Russian archival scene will require a new essay, which is now being prepared as introduction for the published edition of the collaborative directory resulting from further updating of ArcheoBiblioBase. *Archives in Russia 1994* is now planned for publication in parallel Russian and English editions in 1994.

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THE EUPHORIA FOLLOWING THE August 1991 putsch is gone. "Those were the days" in the fall of 1991 when Russian archivists in accordance with a presidential decree took over and reorganized Party archives and witnessed Roskomarkhiv's replacement of the much-maligned Glavarkhiv leadership. Optimism was high that a new era of open, democratically oriented archives was near at hand. By the end of 1992, however, Russian archivists, like the population at large, were finding it harder to assess what they have achieved since the collapse of the Union, and even harder to fathom what lies ahead. Russian archives, like the country at large, are in transition. The profound economic and political crises in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire are profoundly affecting archival reform. The doors have been thrown open and much has been achieved, but there is still a long way to go to bring most archives up to minimal international standards. A new law on archives is being enacted, but there are still no laws governing state secrets, freedom of information, and individual privacy. These cannot realistically precede a new constitution, which is still on the drawing boards.

The intense world interest in coming to terms with the tragedies, ills, and historical skeletons of the Soviet system that collapsed at the end of 1991 has forced increased demands on all archives, even before the archival system has been able to reform itself or find adequate financial support to prepare for the public onslaught. Russian archivists are suddenly having to function in a newly opened world setting for which, in many cases, they are poorly attuned. Even as they are trying to free themselves from the ideological legacy of the past regime in which they were raised, they are at the same time having to bow to the pressures of high-level domestic and international politics. Foreign scholars are still rushing in where once they feared to tread. Journalists are still vying for new revelations—even those

available only for cash on the line—and Hollywood producers are not far behind.

During the tumultuous year 1992, Russian archives were making political headlines from London to Washington, and from Warsaw to Seoul, as yet another sensation emerged from the Politburo, Comintern, or KGB files, and yet another carefully chosen document was read before the "constitutional court" proceedings against the Communist Party in Moscow. The CPSU elite well realized that "documents of CPSU archives are the sharpest weapons of political struggle."¹ Politicians who are trying to establish a viable new regime to replace the disintegrated USSR think likewise. In July 1992 Yeltsin's envoy presented Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel with two isolated, hitherto-suppressed documents demonstrating that Czech communists invited the 1968 invasion.² Highly selective, newly opened files relating to the ill-fated Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were sold to the *Washington Post* for publication in November, after a few others were re-

¹Secret memorandum prepared by the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU to V. Ivashko, assistant general secretary, CC CPSU, 12 August 1991—quoted by Rudolf Pikhov in "The Discovery of Archives in Russia," *Janus: Revue archivistique/Archival Review*, 1 (1993): 9. Pikhov's article was transcribed from a talk presented at the Twelfth Congress of the International Council on Archives (ICA), Montreal, September 1992, and hence no footnote references are included.

²The texts of the two documents were published in the article by Leonid Shinkarev, "Novye dokumenty o sobytiakh avgusta 68-go. Kto priglasil v Pragu sovetskie tanki?" *Izvestiia*, no. 164 (17 July 1992): 7; the first and most important one was republished in English translation and introduced by Mark Kramer in the *Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992): 35. That same bulletin includes an important article by Mark Kramer—apparently written before the July release—"New Sources on the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia" 1, 4–13. See also the analysis by Jan Obrman, "Moscow Reveals Documents on 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1 (18 September 1992): 16–19; and the earlier revelations by Vitalii Iaroshkevskii, "Avgust 1968-go v papkakh Staroi ploshchadi," *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 17 (26 April 1992): 12.

leased by Yeltsin forces to the Russian press.³ Politically well-chosen new documents regarding other Cold War crises and Soviet communist atrocities in various countries have likewise been dribbling out. But in most cases, precise archival identification, contiguous files, and related documentation in other fonds or archives—all of which would be necessary for definitive historical interpretation of events—remain closed to researchers, or at most shrouded in mystery, in contrast to the much more open archival situation that has developed recently in most of the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe.⁴

As if to stem the criticism, chief archivist of Russia, Rudol'f Pikhoia (a close political ally of Yeltsin) was widely pictured on front pages in October 1992 as he flew to Warsaw as Yeltsin's emissary to deliver the long-hidden documents on the Katyn massacre. But immediately the question arose, "Why are the archives 'talking' only now?"⁵ Indeed, like the subsequent release

of the "long-lost" sealed original top-secret "special folder" with the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939,⁶ and the failure to release the full Korean Airlines Flight 007 tapes,⁷ more

mia, no. 43 (October 1992): 12–14. The English version is "Three Men in the Kremlin and a Package—Katyn: Murder Will out," *New Times International*, no. 44 (October 1992): 30–32, and has the headline commentary "The Politburo's resolution dooming the Poles to death has been found at last. Is there anyone gullible enough to believe that it has been found only now?" See also the subsequent revealing article (in the Russian version only) about the earlier archival cover-up: Lev Bezymenskii, "Chuzhaia noga v arkhive. Istorik laviruet mezhdru TsK, KGB, MID i arkhivnyi bonzami," *Novoe vremia*, no. 43 (October 1992): 14–15. See also Konstantin Katanian, "Osobaia li osobaia papka?" *Stolitsa*, no. 44 (30 October 1992): 7; and Aleksandr Gorshkov, "Chelovek nedeli—Mikhail Gorbachev chitit zakon, no 'ne budet uchastvovat' v der'me," *Smena*, no. 240 (16 October 1992): 1. See the Moscow report on Warsaw reactions by Vladimir Kiryanov, "Imena opekunov sovetskikh sekretnykh arkhivov stali izvestny v Varshave," *Rossiiskie vesti*, no. 83 (4 October 1992): 1, and the interview on the subject with Polish President Lech Walesa by Rudolf Boretskii, "Katynskii krest na kommunizme," *Novoe vremia*, no. 44 (October 1992): 22–23 (English version: "The Katyn Cross on Communism's Tomb," *New Times International*, no. 45 [October 1992]: 26–27). See also the retrospective analysis by Vera Tolz, "The Katyn Documents and the CPSU Hearings," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1 (6 November 1992): 27–33. Tolz further suggests that the "misuse" of documents and serious discrepancies between their texts and "Russian officials' statements about them . . . add weight to the charges that the Russian leadership is manipulating the communist party archive for political purposes."

Regarding the revelation of the 1939 secret protocols, see Lev Bezymenskii, "Samyi sekretnyi sekret sekretarei," *Novoe vremia*, no. 45 (November 1992): 10–12; English version: "Greatest Secret of the Party Secretaries—The Original Protocols of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact Have Been Found," *New Times International*, no. 46 (November 1992): 25–27.

⁷Yeltsin had promised release of documents relating to the Korean flight at a press conference in Washington in June; the tapes and additional documents were released to American and Korean authorities in September. Regarding the failure to release all the Korean Airlines tapes, see, for example, the Reuters report datelined Seoul, 15.X.1992, and later analyses that were picked up widely in the press. The technical analysis by James E. Oberg ("Shooting Down the Myths of KAL Flight," *Wall Street Journal*, 21 October 1992, p. A16) does much to dismiss the earlier "spy flight scenarios," but the author fears that such

³See the two-part feature article, "The Afghan Archive," by Michael Dobbs, "Into the Quagmire: Secret Memos Trace Kremlin's March to War," *Washington Post*, 15 November 1992, pp. A1 and A32; and "Reversing Course—Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of War: Gorbachev Led Cry to Abandon Soviet Quagmire During Soviet Secret 1986 Debate," *Washington Post*, 16 November 1992, pp. A1 and A16. See also note 34.

⁴For example, see the Kramer articles about archival revelations regarding the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia (note 2); Csaba Békés, "New Findings on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution," *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 1–3; the several articles in the same issue regarding German archives; and the additional bibliographic citations of relevant literature (36–40).

⁵Valerii Masterov, "Reshenie o rasstrele prinimalos' v TsK," and Nataliia Govorkina, "Zakrytye arkhivy v otkrytoi bor'be," *Moskovskoe novosti*, no. 43 (25 October 1992): 9. The two articles in the Russian edition have the added headline commentary, "Recently documents were openly given out confirming that the Polish officers were executed by officials of the NKVD. *Moscow News* already reported this several years ago on the basis of thorough journalistic investigation. Why are the archives 'talking' only now?" Similar questions are asked in the lengthy discussion with the lead "skandal" by Lev Elin, "Trois pakets v Kreml'e—Katynskie igry," *Novoe vre-*

evidence points to the fact that such delayed, piecemeal, highly censored revelations are being used—or “misused”—as pawns in the troubled post-Soviet political and diplomatic arena.

Archives were similarly used as political ploys at the Washington summit in June 1992, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin got a standing ovation after promising the U.S. Congress conclusive information regarding American prisoners of war and those missing in action who might have ended up in Russia. A few days later, representatives of the Russian-American POW/MIA Commission set off on a hastily assembled, unprecedented visit to the Pechora prison camp in the northern Urals. Beamed to television sets around the world, Yeltsin's remarks and the Pechora visit served their political purpose, although there was one chance in a million that further information—let alone a live American citizen—would be found in Pechora.⁸ Even by the end of the year, and despite its high-level political support, the commission did not have all the answers it sought.⁹

myths will be difficult to dislodge from public perception. In the survey analysis by John W. R. Leppingwell, “Opening the KAL-007 Black Box: New Documents and Old Questions” (*RFE/RL Research Report* 1 [6 November 1992]: 20–26), the author again queries, “Why are these documents being released now?” He concludes that, as in the case of U.S. POWs, “the KAL-007 documents are being used to advance Yeltsin's foreign and domestic policy” (25).

⁸Barbara Crosette, “Yeltsin Describes a List of Missing—Says Names in Investigation Include American Troops Captured in Indochina,” *New York Times*, 18 June 1992, p. A17. The Pechora visit was reported in a separate story datelined Moscow (17 June) immediately following. I quote the analysis of Vladimir Kozlov, Deputy Chairman of Roskomarkhiv and vice-chairman of the Commission, who led the Pechora visit. There were many reports of the expedition, which included a large cortège of journalists; see, for example, Judi Buehrer, “Hunt for POWs Moves to Urals,” *Moscow Times*, no. 31 (19 June 1992): 1, which features the headline story parallel to one entitled “Yeltsin Gets America's Vote,” with a picture of Bush and Yeltsin saluting each other in Washington after signing an arms reduction pact.

⁹This statement reflects the author's conversations

A major exhibition of original “Revelations from Russian Archives” flown in from Moscow for the June summit brought record crowds to the Library of Congress and exceptional press attention.¹⁰ While a few sample documents even were made available on library electronic networks throughout the United States, questions were asked in Russia as to why the state-of-the-art exhibition opened in Washington, D.C., and not in Moscow.¹¹ By mid-November

with several American commission participants at various points during the year. There were many newspaper reports on the subject. See, for example, Valerii Rudnev, “Amerikanskii voennoplennyi: Pervye sekretnye dokumenty iz spetsial'nykh arkhivov,” *Izvestiia*, no. 162 (15 July 1992): 5; and Michael Dobbs, “U.S. POW Prober ‘Not Satisfied’ He Tells Yeltsin,” *Washington Post*, 24 September 1992, pp. A20 and A26. See additional newspaper coverage, cited in *CWHP Bulletin*, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 37. See also note 45 below.

¹⁰See, for example, Serge Schmemmann, “Towards the Washington Summit: The Secret Life of the Workers' State—From Deep in the Soviet Files, Facts, Footnotes, Even (Maybe) Real History,” and “A Grim Record: Hatred, Starvation, an Execution, More Hatred, Chernobyl,” *New York Times*, 15 June 1992, p. A11; and John Wagner, “Secret Soviet Documents Go on Display,” *Washington Post*, 16 June 1992, p. E2. See the published catalogs: *Revelations from the Russian Archives: An Exhibit at the Library of Congress June 17–July 16, 1992* and *Revelations from the Russian Archives: A Checklist* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1992). See the interview by T. I. Bondareva with one of the Russian archivists who accompanied the exhibit, E. A. Turina, “Arkhiivnye dokumenty byvshego SSSR v Vashingtone,” *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 5 (1992): 110–14; and a condensed Russian translation of the *Washington Post* article by Geoffrey Frank, “‘Vashington post’ ob arkhivnykh dokumentakh byvshego SSSR,” *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 5 (1992): 114–16.

¹¹David L. Wilson, “Library of Congress Offers Computer Access to Once-Secret Soviet Documents,” *Chronicle of Higher Education* 30 (24 June 1992): A17. Copies of approximately one-third of the documents sent to Washington were displayed in Moscow in April 1992 for a one-day “press conference,” but many Russian journalists had reason to inquire as to why they were not informed in advance of the specific hour of the formal presentations that accompanied the exhibit which had been organized at the last-minute by Roskomarkhiv. The partial exhibit was opened for one day in Moscow as reported by Leonid Radzikhovskii, “Vcherashnie sekrety—Iz-pod glyb,” *Vecherniaia Moskva*, no. 87 (6 May 1992):

1992, the promised Moscow counterpart exhibition of documents from Party archives appeared to have been forgotten, when a more benign exhibit, "Making Things Work: Russian-American Economic Relations, 1900–1930," opened in the Russian capital, cosponsored by Roskomarkhiv and the Hoover Institution.¹² Given the further-deteriorated political situation in December 1992, Western journalists expressed little hope of public release of even those selected documents read before the Constitutional Court, "despite promises by Yeltsin's aides that they would be put on public display."¹³ Rosarkhiv is, nevertheless, proceeding with a published register of the declassified document read before the court that are to be openly available to researchers.¹⁴

As journalists the world over vie for new revelations in contemporary archives, usually focusing on the most sensational and hence most newsworthy newly released documents, they are rarely given the possibility or have the time to explore the appropriate historical context by analyzing

contiguous documents. Nevertheless, their revelations suggest the untapped riches scholars still need to analyze. Regrettably, too, the competition for sensations resulted in archival scandals and dubious publication practices. "Archival Piracy Threatens Freedom of Information," suggested a Moscow journalist in February 1992, after the scandal broke over a 1943 letter of the Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti from Comintern records which was illegally published in Italy.¹⁵ In July 1992 another scandal erupted over copies of the Goebbels diaries held in Moscow, selections from which were published in the *Sunday Times* (London)—initially with inaccurate attribution and without permission of the archives—as rendered by a controversial anti-Semitic British historian, as if he were the one to have made the discovery.¹⁶

¹⁵Ella Maksimova, "Arkhivnoe piratstvo ugrozhaet svobode informatsii," *Izvestiia*, no. 44 (22 February 1992): 7.

¹⁶See "Goebbels's Diaries 'Found in Russia,'" *The Times* (London), 3 July 1992, p. 3. Selections of the diaries in the translation of David Irving were published in successive issues of the *Sunday Times*, 5, 12, and 19 July 1992. See the commentaries from London and Moscow under the headline "Originally dnevnikov Gebbel'sa khраниatsia v rossiiskom MIDE"; Aleksandr Krivopalov, "V Londone utverzhdaiut, shto gotovitsia sensatsiia," and Ella Maksimova, "V Moskve uverenii, shto rech' idet ob izvestnykh dokumentakh," *Izvestiia*, no. 158 (9 July 1992): 6. Glenn Frankel, "The Furor over Goebbels's Diaries—*Sunday Times* Blasted for Deal with Neo-Nazi," *Washington Post*, 11 July 1992. See also Lev Bezymenskii, "Kyda popali dnevyki Gebbel'sa," *Novoe vremia*, no. 30 (July 1992): 54–55. See the later commentary by Sergei Svistunov, "Torgovtsy pamiat'iu," *Pravda*, no. 113 (29 August 1992): 5; and the earlier article about Irving by Sergei Svistunov, "Krasnykh"—vidiat, 'korichnevyykh'—net," *Pravda*, no. 104 (8 August 1992): 4. Contrary to the initial *Times* article, the glass negatives and photostatic copy of the diary held in the Center for the Preservation of Historico-Documentary Collections (TsKhIDK) had already been described in several articles, the first by Maksimova in *Izvestiia* in February 1990 and in more scholarly detail by Bernd Wegner, "Deutsche Aktenbestände im moskauer Zentralen Staatsarchiv. Ein Erfahrungsbericht," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 40 (1992, no. 2): 311–19.

2. According to the *CHE* article, because of adverse Moscow reaction and, as if to counter potential criticism, Roskomarkhiv Chairman Pikhoia felt forced to limit the number of documents that were scanned and available electronically in the United States.

¹²See the bilingual catalog of the exhibit, *Chto by dela shli: Rossiisko-amerikanskii ekonomicheskie otnosheniia, 1900–1930 gg. / Making Things Work: Russian-American Economic Relations, 1900–1930. An Exhibition Catalog for a Joint Historical Exhibit of Documents and Photographs Organized by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace and the Committee on Archival Affairs of the Russian Federation (ROSKOMARKHIV)* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1992).

¹³Michael Dobbs, "Court Backs Yeltsin on Party Ban: Ruling Would Let Communists Rebuild," *Washington Post*, 1 December 1992, p. A27. See note 60 below.

¹⁴*Arkhivy Kremliia i Staroi ploshchadi. Series 1: Spravochno-informatsionnye materialy. Spravochnik po dokumentam, predstavlenym v Konstitutsionnyi sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii po "delu KPSS," Part 1, Arkhivno-informatsionnyi biulleten'* (supplement to *Istoricheskii arkhiv*), 1993, no. 1/2. Additional volumes in the series are in preparation.

Russian archives have indeed been thrown into an international arena of diplomatic negotiations, public interest, and political scandal beyond imagination before the attempted August coup. Growing politicization is exemplified in various bilateral agreements on data regarding the fate of prisoners of war, demands for documentation on various Soviet foreign exploits and scandals, and negotiations for the restitution of captured records held in Moscow. Russian archivists are trying to assume a more normal international posture vis-à-vis their foreign colleagues, and the International Council on Archives has organized a series of colloquia on Russian archives. The first meeting held in Paris in July 1992 brought Roskomarkhiv face to face with an assembled colloquium of Western archival leaders with thorny legal and procedural questions relating to captured Western records in Russia and archival Rossica abroad, ownership rights to the Comintern archives, newly imposed license fees, and rights to access and use of Russian archives, among other subjects.¹⁷ Within the European community, a host of joint projects, bilateral agreements, and collaborative ventures are under way on various levels.

Yet on the home front, a backlash of conservative Russian nationalist reaction is

decrying what they see as unwarranted Western involvement, the "alienation abroad of the heritage of the Fatherland," and, what is worse in their view, the feeling that the archival treasures of the nation are being "sold off" too cheaply abroad with insufficient cultural benefits in return. Such are the echoes on the archival front of the broader political complaints that Yeltsin himself is selling Russia out to the West. At the same time, democratic forces are decrying commercialization, politicization, and resulting declassification delays that have not brought the degree of public access promised. Newspaper accounts have portrayed only a part of the story when they ponder "What Answers Lurk in the Billions of Uncataloged Pages?"¹⁸ The fact is that most archives are more open and accessible to researchers to an extent even beyond the dreams of the era of *glasnost*'. While some researchers complain about lack of access and new high fees for services, and while archival revelations continue to be sold for hard currency to news networks, commercial publishers, and Hollywood producers, many of the problems in the general archival situation pointed out at the end of 1991 still pertain.¹⁹ Russian archival reformers are being forced to adopt more cautious attitudes in face of international scandals, financial catastrophe, and the reactionary criticism and political uncertainties they face at home. At the end of the traumatic year 1992, as more conservative and less innovative political forces have been able to reassert themselves on

¹⁷See the frank report on the Paris meetings by V. P. Kozlov, who represented Roskomarkhiv (together with V. P. Tarasov, head of the International Department) in lieu of R. G. Pikhoia, who because of political crises on the home front was unable to make the trip: "Mezhdunarodnyi kollokvium arkhivistov v Parizhe," *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 6 (1992): 105–08. A follow-up meeting was held at the ICA Congress in Montreal in early September 1993, and further meetings are planned. A conference on East European archives, also sponsored by ICA, was held in Cracow in mid-November 1992. Archival leaders from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, together with representatives from Rosarkhiv and Russian archives, attended the ICA Congress in Montreal, and those countries have formally been admitted to membership in the international organization sponsored by UNESCO.

¹⁸The Soviet Archives—What Answers Lurk in the Billions of Uncataloged Pages?" *New York Times*, 19 July 1992, p. E18. The correspondent listed many lingering questions, the answers to which might be found in newly opened CPSU and KGB files (or, as the editor fails to explain, that might still remain hidden).

¹⁹See the Grimsted report on the archival situation at the end of 1991, "Beyond *Perestroika*," *American Archivist* 55 (Winter 1992): 94–124, and the more extensive preprint version issued by IREX.

the political front, many question marks remain. Given current political and economic realities, and despite newly released selected files, some wonder about the extent to which progressive archival reform can continue, and others query—"Why are the archives so closed?" or "Who will break the seventh seal?"²⁰

The Role of the State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv—formerly Roskomarkhiv) and the Organization of Archives

A comprehensive law "On the Archival Fond of the Russian Federation and Archives" awaits enactment by a legislature in a country still awaiting a new constitution and lacking the economic viability to provide the full range of archival services which that law will require. In the meantime, most state archives—including former Communist party archives—throughout Russia are being administered under the guidance of the State Archival Service of Russia—or Rosarkhiv (*Gosudarstvennaia arkhivnaia sluzhba Rossii*), as the archival agency was officially renamed by the presidential decree of 30 September 1992 in the context of other government structural reorganization.²¹ That decree called for the

abolition of the previous Committee for Archival Affairs of the Government of the Russian Federation (*Komitet po delam arkhivov pri Pravitel'stve Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), which, since its establishment in the fall of 1990, had been known by its acronym Roskomarkhiv. Implementation was delayed, however, so that Roskomarkhiv continued to function under its earlier guidelines until a government decree defining the functions of the State Archival Service was signed into law on 22 December 1992.²²

At the end of 1991, Roskomarkhiv had taken over the all-union level central state archives under Glavarkhiv, which means that Rosarkhiv now controls over two thousand state and former Party archives, with over two hundred million files, throughout the Russian Federation. Simultaneously, Roskomarkhiv absorbed the entire massive Glavarkhiv bureaucracy, including its archival research institute VNIIDAD (without regard to previous staff links with state security or CPSU organs). Despite growing conservative political backlash, Roskomarkhiv leadership has been making great progress throughout the year in democratization and progressive reform of the archival system.²³

²⁰Petr Iakolev, "Pochemu arkhivy zakryty?" *Rossiiskie vesti*, no. 60 (22 September 1992): 2; Arkady Cheresnaya, "Who Will Break the Seventh Seal?" *New Times International*, no. 29 (July 1992): 30–31.

²¹The presidential decree "O strukture tsentral'nykh organov federal'noi ispolnitel'noi vlasti," no. 1148 (30.IX.1992), is printed in its entirety in *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, no. 220 (7 October 1992): 4. The fourth paragraph calling for the "reorganization of the Committee on Archival Affairs of the Government of the Russian Federation into the State Archival Service of Russia" is reproduced in *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 6 (1992): 3, along with the relevant paragraphs from the second presidential decree of the same day, "O sisteme tsentral'nykh organov federal'noi ispolnitel'noi vlasti," no. 1147. That decree on the reorganization of government administrative organs was stymied by the Supreme Soviet a week later. The legislature remained at odds with the president about the further course of government reorganization and reform, and hence Roskomarkhiv continued to function as before under the June guidelines (see note 25) until the end of the year.

²²O Gosudarstvennoi arkhivnoi sluzhbe Rossii, "Pravitel'stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Postanovlenie ot 22 dekabria 1992 g., no. 1006. A copy of this decree is included as an appendix in *Russian Archives 1993: A Brief Directory* (Princeton, N.J.: IREX, 1993). In the text that follows, the acronym Roskomarkhiv is retained for references to the period before the fall of 1992, when it was transformed into Rosarkhiv, as it is known now.

²³Details of these and other policy and administrative developments and plans for Roskomarkhiv are set forth in the summary report by Roskomarkhiv Chairman R. G. Pikhov, "Ob itogakh deiatel'nosti uchrezhdenii Gosudarstvennoi arkhivnoi sluzhby v 1991 g. i osnovnykh napravleniakh razvitiia arkhivnogo dela v Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 1992 g.," *Vestnik arkhivista* 2, no. 8 (1992): 4–27, and the related resolutions taken by the Roskomarkhiv governing board dated 11 March 1992, *Vestnik arkhivista* 2, no. 8 (1992): 28–40. See also the popularized presentation by Pikhov, "Otkrytie arkhivov v Rossii," *Rodina*, no. 1 (1992): 80–81.

Rosarkhiv chairman and Russia's chief state archivist, Rudol'f Germanovich Pikhov, a close political ally of Yeltsin, is himself a historian of the eighteenth century and was formerly the vice rector of Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinberg) University. He has actively recruited new blood and tried to democratize archival administration, drawing on the earlier Russian tradition of placing respected historians in archival leadership, in contrast to Soviet-style bureaucrats and often nonarchivists in the top controlling archival ranks. For example, Vladimir Petrovich Kozlov, a well-qualified historian of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russia, who had previously served as scientific secretary of the Division of History of the Academy of Sciences, was appointed after the August coup attempt to direct reorganization of the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents (Records) of Modern History (RTsKhIDNI) based on the former Central Party Archive. In March 1992, as tribute to his talents in redirecting archival efforts, he was promoted to deputy chair of Roskomarkhiv in charge of archival usage and publications. Kozlov was succeeded at RTsKhIDNI by Kirill Mikhailovich Anderson, a specialist in English history from the Academy of Sciences with considerable experience abroad.

Another democratically oriented historian of the nineteenth-century bureaucracy, Sergei Vladimirovich Mironenko, was appointed in October 1991 as deputy director of the new Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), formed on the basis of the post-1953 CPSU Central Committee archives, and in June 1992, Mironenko became the new director of the reorganized State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF). Simultaneously, he was replaced at *Staryi ploshchad* by Vitalii Iur'evich Afiani, another in the reforming circle, who had already succeeded in revitalizing a new documentary publication, *Russkii arkhiv*. Some other

state archival leaders and several archival directors have been drawn from outside the former Glavarkhiv bureaucracy, although a large majority come from within the former Glavarkhiv establishment despite bitter complaints during the year from within and outside of Roskomarkhiv.²⁴ With the new governmental reform and the economic reforms and inflation, significant staff cuts are anticipated in the course of 1993, which undoubtedly will result in further leadership changes.

The 22 December decree now supersedes the earlier decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 24 June 1992, which provided provisional new guidelines for the administration of Russian archives by Roskomarkhiv with definition of its functions and a revised organizational structure for the federative-level state archives it administers.²⁵ According to the revised organizational structure of the 24 June decree, eighteen federative-level state archives and archival centers were to be administered directly by Roskomarkhiv, and this arrangement continues unchanged under Rosarkhiv according to the 22 December decree. All are essentially existing repositories with new names—either former central state all-union or RSFSR predecessors or the three separate centers (curiously named “records storage—or preservation—centers” rather than archives) established after the attempted August coup on the basis of earlier central CPSU and Komsomol archives.²⁶ All still

²⁴In addition to Mironenko, five other directors were replaced in June 1992, but many of the old guard remain.

²⁵“O Komitete po delam arkhivov pri Pravitel'stve Rossiiskoi Federatsii i seti federal'nykh gosudarstvennykh arkhivov i tsentrov khraneniia dokumentatsii,” Pravitel'stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Postanovlenie ot 24 iunia 1992 g., no. 430. A copy of this decree is included as an appendix to *Russian Archives 1993*. It is also published in *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 4 (1992): 3–10, and in the in-house Roskomarkhiv *Informatsionnyi biulleten'*, no. 1 (1992): 8–18.

²⁶The list of current archives under Rosarkhiv (with

basically retain their former organization, location, and collecting profile. The most important (and controversial) structural innovation was the combining of the earlier Central State Archive of the October Revolution of the USSR (TsGAOR SSSR) and the Central State Archive of the RSFSR (TsGA RSFSR) to form the new State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF), which had already been decreed at the end of April.²⁷ Given the existence of these eighteen different federative-level archives, the concept of a so-called State Archive of the Russian Federation in the sense of a comprehensive federal archive remains something of an anomaly, at least in comparison to Western national archives or the German Bundesarchiv.

Although many specialists favor bringing major ministry and other agency archives together under a centralized restructured Archival Fond of Russia, archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Security, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, along with those of a number of other

high-level state agencies, to say nothing of the all-important Presidential Archive, still remain powers unto themselves, outside the system of federal archives administered by the State Archival Service, similar to the much-criticized earlier situation under Glavarkhiv.²⁸ According to the presidential decree of 24 August 1991, the KGB archives—now controlled by the Russian Ministry of State Security—were to come under Roskomarkhiv control. By January 1993, however, none of the central all-union-level or federal-level KGB files have been accessioned by Rosarkhiv, and a decision has not yet been reached as to whether a new state archival repository will be organized for them or whether they will be deposited in GA RF. In contrast to most Western nations, but in the prerevolutionary Russian tradition, records of central, federal-level government and high agencies of state and CPSU rule thus remain more decentralized on the administrative level of archival repositories. And depositing agencies still maintain considerable control over appraisal and declassification guidelines for the records they turn over to the State Archival Service, although the December decree is supposed to give Rosarkhiv more control in these areas.

The centrifugal pattern is even more noticeable in the case of archives of republic, autonomous republic, *krai* (region), *oblast* (county), and city levels, where state archives are now directly under local governmental control. Countering criticism of perpetrating the top-heavy, overcentralized Glavarkhiv administrative command system, archives on lower administrative levels are being given increasing autonomy—especially fiscal autonomy—under decentralized, local administrative agencies, although they remain ultimately responsible to the State Archival Service. Local state

their former names) together with additional major federative-level archives under other agencies are listed in *Archives in Russia, 1993*.

²⁷As an example of the criticism, see Natal'ia Davydova, "Sol'itsia, no bez ezekstazy," *Moskovskii novosti*, no. 23 (7 June 1992): 3. During a May 1992 meeting of the Scientific Council at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU), attended by many Roskomarkhiv leaders and directors of the Russian federal archives, many of the directors and MGIAI instructors alike voiced biting criticism of the formation of the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF) and more generally of the administrative posture taken by Roskomarkhiv. Similar criticism was voiced at other Roskomarkhiv meetings I attended, and even more outspoken criticism arose in private conversations with numerous archivists. There has been some discussion that the new consolidated "federal archive" should also absorb the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE, formerly TsGANKh SSSR), which (unlike TsGA RSFSR across the city) is actually housed in the same building and shares a reading room with the former TsGAOR SSSR part of GA RF. Such a development would largely restore the archival organization that had existed before the formation of TsGANKh and TsGA RSFSR in the 1960s.

²⁸See the list of major federal-level archives not under Rosarkhiv in *Archives in Russia, 1993*.

archives in some areas have already accessioned over half a million files from the KGB, well in advance of their federative-level counterparts. Municipal and oblast state archives in St. Petersburg—now under the Archival Administration of the Mayor's Office—were reorganized and renamed earlier in 1992. Local city government archives in Moscow all form part of the Consolidated Moscow Municipal Archives under the Moscow Mayor's Office, separate from those of the oblast archives; they still retain their former names, except for the newly added former local Moscow Party Archive (now called the Central State Archive of Social Movements of the City of Moscow).

Rosarkhiv (like the earlier Roskomarkhiv) has continued to be charged with the central responsibility for the accession, preservation, control, and utilization of the national archival legacy—the so-called Archival Fond of the Russian Federation—and with making it more accessible to the public through an appropriate information system and reference publications. Legal specifications for its rights and obligations in this regard are spelled out in the 22 December decree. Such tasks are much more difficult in the new, more decentralized governmental and fiscal context where mechanisms of control and economic resources are hardly equivalent to the needs. Added to the current crisis is the traditional decentralization of many culturally significant components of the national archival heritage and their dispersal under many different agencies which also lack the more abundant fiscal resources they enjoyed under Soviet rule. This is particularly true of the Academy of Sciences, which never before had to function within a market economy, and the numerous libraries and museums under the Ministry of Culture and other agencies, which relished vast budgets for their Communist educational and propagandistic functions. Many libraries and museums have already been renamed and reorganized: In January 1992, the Lenin

Library became the Russian State Library, and in March the St. Petersburg Public Library, which during the Soviet years bore the name of Saltykov-Shchedrin, dropped its historic name to become the National Library of Russia. But even such prestigious national institutions have not found viable fiscal and administrative means of ensuring the nationwide public functions their new names imply, and in both cases their manuscript riches are threatened for want of even minimally adequate preservation facilities, as the cultural world recalls the fire that ravaged their sister Library of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg in 1988.

Further revamping and control of the nationwide archival administrative system were spelled out in the 22 December decree, but practical implementation lies ahead. Implications of the new Rosarkhiv responsibilities and changes in archival administration are still being worked out in the broader framework of government reorganization. Some archivists were proposing that with the government reorganization, other government agency archives—especially those of major federal ministries—would also come under more direct jurisdiction of the State Archival Service. The December decree extends Rosarkhiv jurisdiction over more technical archival functions, such as appraisal and accession schedules and standardization of arrangement and descriptive and conservation guidelines, but it would appear the strong independent tradition of separate agency archives for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Defense, and State Security, along with some other government agencies is being preserved. Further reorganization and definition of the Archival Fond of the Russian Federation may be expected when the law on archives is enacted, but the implications and extent of changes are not yet clear, and debates continue within the framework of the current transitional government situation and the struggle for political power.

Access and Use

Although a comprehensive archival law has yet to pass the legislature, and although as yet no law either defines state secrets and individual privacy or provides for public freedom of information, the revolutionary changes of recent years in terms of access and use of archival materials were, at least provisionally, endorsed by legislative act. A decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted on 19 June 1992 provides for access to government records within thirty years of the date of their creation, except for files legally classified as "state secrets." By setting a thirty-year rule, the decree potentially can give more contemporary archives the means of limiting access to files less than thirty years old, but the decree as written does not prohibit opening files earlier. Records relating to private personal matters of an individual citizen are to be accessible after seventy-five years.²⁹ This first normative act regarding Russian archives since Peter the Great provides for the right of access to archives and their finding aids within archives for citizens and organizations of Russia and foreign countries alike. The concept of public domain for state records, however, has not arrived in Russia, and the December decree also confirms the right of the State Archival Service to regulate and sell license agreements for commercial use

and publication of archival documents, as had been specified in the June decree.

Detailed "Provisional Regulations for Access and Use of Archives," adopted by Roskomarkhiv on 29 May and published in July, amplify and clarify many of the points in the 19 June decree cited above, at least for records in archives now under the control of the State Archival Service.³⁰ Many of the broader issues involved in the use of Russian archives within their present political and economic crisis have been put in perspective in the forward to the IREX directory by Rosarkhiv Deputy Chairman Vladimir Kozlov, who bore a principal responsibility for formulation of the regulations and who is now charged with major responsibility for implementation in that area of Rosarkhiv activity.³¹

Of particular importance to researchers in contemporary history, the Roskomarkhiv instructions have the added provision that, unless legally designated secret, records already deposited in state archives are to be declassified automatically after fifty years (i.e., at present, documents predating 1942); because that provision was not included in the legislative decree it pertains only to government records in archives then under the jurisdiction of Roskomarkhiv. Since secrecy has not been legally redefined, conflicts may arise over older files

²⁹Vremennoe polozhenie—O poriadke dostupa k arkhivnym dokumentam i pravilakh ikh ispol'zovaniia," Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 19 iunია 1992 g., no. 3088-1. The law is published in *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 5 (1992): 3; a copy is included as an appendix to *Archives in Russia*, 1993. An English translation appears in *American Association for the Advancement of Slavica Studies Newsletter* 32 (November 1992): 3–5. The ITAR-TASS news release emphasized the more restrictive side of the decree: "The Russian parliament ruled on Friday [19 June] that access will be temporarily limited to classified and top secret archives which are not 30 years old yet," as quoted in *FBIS-SOV-92-120* (22 June 1992), p. 53, with the headline "Access Limited to Classified Files."

³⁰"O vremennom poriadke dostupa k arkhivnym dokumentam i ikh ispol'zovaniia," Postanovlenie Roskomarkhiv, ot 15 iunია 1992 g. (Moscow: Roskomarkhiv, 1992). A copy of this decree is included as an appendix in *Archives in Russia*, 1993.

³¹See the preface to *Russian Archives* 1993. Many of the ideas expressed there are developed further in Kozlov's essay, "Ob ispol'zovanii dokumentov rossiiskikh arkhivov," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 6 (1992): 77–82; Kozlov's introduction served as the basis for his presentation at a meeting at the Twelfth Congress of the International Council on Archives in Montreal and subsequently on a panel at the congress of the Society of American Archives; a condensed Russian version was published in *Vestnik arkhivista* 5, no. 11 (1992): 70–74. A variant English version appears in the ICA journal *Janus: Revue archivistique/Archival Review*, no. 1 (1993): 11–17.

in postrevolutionary archives that have not been formally declassified by military or other security authorities. Furthermore, there is a gap between the provision for automatic declassification after fifty years and the implementation of such a provision within the archives themselves. Thus a number of archives under the State Archival Service—most especially GA RF, the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE), and the two military archives with holdings from the 1920s and 1930s (the Russian State Military Archive [RGVA], formerly TsGASA, and the Russian State Archive of the Navy [RGAVMF], formerly TsGAVMF)—are still holding out on many fonds.

The former Central Party Archive itself became a model for professional research arrangements, when it reopened to the public as the Center for the Storage (Preservation) and Study of Documents (Records) of Modern History (RTsKhIDNI) in December 1991. *Opisi* (i.e., internal inventories that serve as series-level divisions as well as the basic finding aids within fonds) are now housed in the main reading room; reference services are vastly improved; and a new brief guide listing all *opisi* and other finding aids (even those still classified) is now in press.³² The most serious complaint is that many important files, even those from

the early decades of Bolshevik rule, still remain in the Presidential Archive, and even RTsKhIDNI archivists are not provided with the data needed to identify parts of fonds that are split between the two repositories. Many files relating to CPSU international activities, including the records of the Central Committee International Department from the 1940s and early 1950s, personnel files, and other still-restricted materials from the postwar period have not been declassified.

Western researchers have more complaints about the extent of restrictions on many high-interest post-1953 CPSU files in the still separate so-called Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) at *Staryi ploshchad*.³³ The problems of access to TsKhSD reflect the fact that major Politburo records that should be found there remain in the Presidential Archive, and the card files and computer catalogs that would help researchers access several of the most important fonds are neither declassified nor in a condition that would make public access feasible at present. Because of the contemporaneous nature of the archive, declassification and public release has been particularly subject to political purposes. As a *Washington Post* journalist, who purchased publication rights to recently declassified documents relating to the Afghan war, noted,

Obtaining access to the declassified Politburo records is not easy. In theory, they should be freely available.

³²See V. P. Kozlov, "Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniiia dokumentov noveishei istorii i ego perspektivy," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 2 (1992): 192–97; and "Byvshii Tsentral'nyi partarkhiv otkryvaet dveri" (including an interview with V. P. Kozlov), *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 2 (1992): 3–14. See also the published collection of reports and other materials regarding the reorganization and research arrangements in that archive, O. V. Naumov, V. N. Shepelev, and V. S. Shumikhin, compilers, *O Tsentral'nogo partiinogo arkhiva—k Rossiiskomu tsentru khraneniia i izucheniiia dokumentov noveishei istorii (RTsKhIDNI). Informatsionnyi sbornik*, edited by V. P. Kozlov and K. M. Anderson (Moscow: VNIIDAD, 1992; "Peredovoi opyt v oblasti dokumentovedeniia i arkhivnogo dela. Informatsionnyi sbornik," no. 1[9]). The new guide is being published under Western sponsorship (see note 138).

³³See R. A. Usikov, "K sozdaniiu TsKhSD," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 2 (1992): 198–202; and S. V. Mironenko, "Prezentatsiia: Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi dokumentatsii," *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 3 (1992): 3. See also the newspaper account of the opening exhibit with many published documents introduced by Evgenii Kuz'min, "Tainaia zhizn' TsK KPSS," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, no. 10 (26 February 1992): 13, and Ella Maksimova, "Arkhiy Staroi ploshchadi otkryty dlia novykh posetitelei," *Izvestiia*, no. 47 (25 February 1992): 7.

In practice, distribution is tightly controlled. According to Russian journalists . . . , the records are frequently used for political purposes. Many of the documents that have been released show Mikhail Gorbachev in a bad light. On occasion, documents are sold to the highest bidder or given to a foreign government.³⁴

The archive is plagued with accusations of corrupt practices in the sale of exclusive rights to newly declassified documents, and even those that have not yet formally been declassified.

Foreign researchers are finding important evidence for the actual implementation of CPSU rule on the grass-roots level in the abundant remains of local Party records. Improved access and reformed working conditions have not yet come, however, to the Central State Archive of Social Movements of the City of Moscow, founded on the basis of the former Moscow Party Archive. The very fact that research was possible at all in that archive during 1990–91 was seen as a triumph of glasnost'.³⁵ However, during the summer of 1992, a senior American professor reported often "quite absurd" restrictions, in some cases more so than the year before (when the Party was still in power), and an "operating philos-

ophy . . . of negativism and mistrust" of foreigners. Archivists often refused to communicate files without explanation. Even more distressing, "Lurking in the background was the issue of *sotrudnichestvo*: . . . Cooperation meant essentially me paying, at a grossly inflated price in dollars, for them to do research on my behalf, using of course all the files that I was not allowed to use."³⁶ In that Moscow archive and in the former St. Petersburg Party archive as well, the extensive internal card catalogs remain closed to researchers.

Some reports from researchers indicate much more success in local Party records outside of Moscow and Petersburg. Indeed, the fact that local KGB files have been transferred to state archival custody and the extent to which grass-roots Party records have been preserved in many areas increase the attraction and research opportunities for twentieth-century topics in oblast-level archives. But lack of adequate information about progress in declassification and working conditions in specific regions is not yet systematically available.

Obviously, the new Roskomarkhiv regulations can hardly remedy all the problems overnight. Researchers must remember that in many cases they are dealing with the same archivists who for decades were taught to withhold archival files and provide disinformation, especially to foreigners. Only time will tell how soon more progressive attitudes will penetrate the traditional Soviet archival mentality and spread through-

³⁴Michael Dobbs, "The Opening of the Politburo's Archives: Closely Guarded Minutes Made Public, but Access Still Isn't Easy," *Washington Post*, 15 November 1992, p. A32. Dobbs explained that documents on the decision to invade were released free of charge by Yeltsin's representatives, but he paid a fee of \$400 to TsKhSD for additional documents. Dobbs's story about the archive was published as an insert in connection with his larger two-part article on the Afghan war, "The Afghan Archive" (see note 3). It is to be hoped that the documents so gleaned by journalists can be deposited in some public collection in the United States, where they can be available to researchers.

³⁵See David L. Hoffman, "A First Glimpse into the Moscow Party Archive," *Russian Review* 50 (October 1991): 484–86, based on research the year before.

³⁶Quotations are from a report to the author (dated 8 December 1992) by Timothy Colton, director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, following a research visit during June and July of 1992. Colton explained that "narrow interpretation continues of earlier restrictions relating to defense industries that have not been revoked; restrictions on documents relating to Party cadres and *nomenklatura* increased, while protocols were refused with the explanation that individual Party members were named, and hence the seventy-five year closing should apply." A copy of Colton's report was been submitted to Rosarkhiv for investigation.

out the far-flung archival system. Many of the problems also stem from inadequate staff and increased work load due to the massive new accessions during the past year. Considerable time will be required to integrate hitherto classified files into a researcher-oriented reference system and to revamp the opis, without which files cannot be communicated to researchers according to Russian practice. Russian archives are open to an extent that they have never been open before, but in a country so long isolated from the world and from the world economy, it is going to take time to institute new professional standards. And it is also going to take considerably more financial outlay than is presently available to bring archival conditions up to international norms.

Such problems notwithstanding, with its new regulations, Roskomarkhiv instituted a new grievance procedure and is encouraging researchers, including visiting scholars from abroad, who are dissatisfied with access provisions or research conditions to air their complaints in written reports or personal visits to the archival agency staff. There is little the State Archival Service can do, however, regarding access to archives outside its jurisdiction, and the biggest complaints still come from those seeking access to files on high-visibility topics in archives that remain under independent agency jurisdiction, especially in contemporary archives under the Ministries of State Security, Foreign Affairs, and Defense.

A law on state secrecy is still on the drawing boards, but debates continue as to whether the public's right to full information should take precedence over the potential danger of full public knowledge of the secrets of past regimes and of the extent of government repression of unfavorable information. But even a new law on state secrecy is not going to resolve all of the questions or open all the doors, particularly when so many of the Soviet elite *nomenklatura* remain in power. A commission of

the Supreme Soviet headed by General Dmitrii Volkogonov has been working since the fall of 1991 on the terms of declassification of all-union KGB files and their transfer to state archival custody, but progress is slow, and there is little likelihood that agent files will be opened as they have been in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.³⁷ The feeling is still strong in many circles that Russia is not ready for the type of open access to information known in the West or even in other formerly Communist-dominated countries of Eastern Europe. A brief survey presented at a Roskomarkhiv meeting in June 1992 by a current KGB archival official provides the first published data about the organization of the archive.³⁸

Representatives of Memorial, the independent human rights institute founded by Andrei Sakharov, have been working in the Central Archives of the Ministry of State Security (former KGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (former MVD) to an unprecedented extent, and have recently produced a penetrating survey of their history, holdings, and related problems.³⁹ In the case of the former archive, at the end of October 1992 its official coordinates in Liubianka Square were printed in a newspaper article for the first time, suggesting it was open for inquiries—"Call and you will be as-

³⁷See the insightful article by Vera Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," *RFE/RL Report 1* (17 April 1992): 1-17.

³⁸V. K. Vinogradov (zamestitel' nachal'nika otdela Ministerstva bezopasnosti Rossii), "Iz soobshchenii na soveshchaniia-seminare v Roskomarkhive," *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 5 (1992): 4-5.

³⁹See Arsenii Roginskii and Nikita Okhotin, "Arkhivy KGB: god posle putcha," *Sovremennaiia Rossiia: Vzgliaid iznutri. Politika. Pravo. Kul'tura. Sbornik statei rossiiskikh issledovatelei k 10-letiiu Instituta Vostochnoi Evropy pri Bremenskom universitete*, compiled by A. B. Roginskii (Moscow/Bremen, 1992). The authors kindly made an advance copy available to me. Because publication delay made many of the articles outdated by the time they appeared, it was not put on public sale. A German edition is in press.

sisted”⁴⁰ In the latter case, the ministry has established an Information Center for Victims of Repression, which is open for public inquiries. Memorial is currently preparing a directory of prison camps with notes about their available archival records and a biobibliographic directory of security organs during the entire Soviet epoch. An important decree adopted on 23 June 1992 provides for the declassification of files relating to victims of repression and regular reporting of declassified fonds, although the agencies involved were unable to fulfill its provisions by the stipulated 23 September 1992 deadline.⁴¹

Since the reorganization and split of the former all-union KGB in November 1991, the archives of foreign intelligence operations (formerly the KGB First Main Division) have been taken over by the separate Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (*Sluzhba vneshnei razvetki RF*), headed by Evgenii Primakov, but complaints continue about the persisting “old mentality” and lack of researcher access to the archives of that organization.⁴² Many are concerned that the sale of exclusive publication rights for high-interest KGB foreign intelligence files to the New York-based Crown Publishing Group (a subsidiary of Random House) could delay for up to ten years the democratic opening of those records, and they fear that the multimillion-dollar deal will establish a precedent of “commercial secrets” for other files considered salable for similar profit.⁴³ Yet even

the high price tag is no guarantee of full information in the Crown series, as FIS Public Affairs Chief Iurii Kobaladze implied at a Washington press conference in June: “Don’t think we are going to reveal everything, you know. Don’t worry about that.”⁴⁴

Complaints about the inadequacy of data on POW/MIA cases by American members of the joint U.S.–Russian Commission, despite the full revelation promised by Yeltsin, leave many less than optimistic about broader public release of reliable data from intelligence archives, much less the possibility of access to the archives themselves. The commission does not question the integrity of President Yeltsin or the Russian Cochair Volkogonov in their sincere at-

nikov, deputy chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet on Human Rights and member of the Commission on Formation and Control of Government Law Enforcement and Security Organs, KGB foreign intelligence records have not been turned over to Roskomarkhiv, and the FIS authorities claim the right to sell off publication rights themselves. See S. Drozdov, “Skandal—Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki prodal sekretnye arkhivy” (interview with Nikolai Arzhannikov), *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, no. 206 (3 November 1992): 4. That story suggested that a final agreement had not been signed, although it probably would be momentarily. According to Crown Publications, however, a definitive ten-year agreement was already signed when details were presented in the Crown press release (24 June 1992) and reported in numerous newspaper stories thereafter. In another interview, James Wade, senior editor at Crown for the KGB project, said “there was nothing ‘shady’ about the deal [since] the Russians don’t share U.S. concepts of public domain” (as quoted by Andrea C. Rutherford, “Information Flow Is Freer in Russia, but It Is Not Free: Archival Gatekeepers Expect to Be Paid in Cash or Kind for Their Valuable Records,” *Wall Street Journal*, 10 July 1992, p. 1). In a telephone interview with the present author, Wade said they discounted the *Komsomol'skaia pravda* story, but he refused to furnish any details about the contract, or even name the organization with which it was concluded.

⁴⁴Kobaladze, RIS Public Affairs and Press Bureau Chief, was quoted at the press conference when the agreement was signed by Jeffrey A. Frank, “The Spies Out in the Sunshine: Crown to Publish KGB Secrets,” *Washington Post*, 25 June 1992, p. C8. It is not clear where negotiations stand for Hollywood film rights to various files as were announced earlier (see Grimsted, “Beyond Perestroika,” 10–11).

⁴⁰Aleksei Vorob'ev, “Memorial—Taina sed'mogo fonda: kruzhok—vyzov zakliuchennogo iz kamery; galochka—pogruzka v mashinu; procherk—vystrel; eshche odna galochka—smert',” *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, no. 238 (31 October 1992): 4.

⁴¹“O sniatii ogranichitel'nykh grifov o zakonodatel'nykh i innykh aktakh, sluzhivshikh osnovaniem dlia massovykh repressii i posiatel'stv na prava cheloveka,” Ukaz Prezidenta Rossii ot 23.VI.1992.

⁴²Charles Gati, op-ed letter, *New York Times*, 11 July 1992, reprinted in *AAASS Newsletter* 32 (September 1992): 7.

⁴³According to an interview with Nikolai Arzhan-

tempts to assist. Rather, as Ambassador Malcolm Toon, the American Cochair, explained in late September 1992, "The problem is with the people under them, the *apparatchiki*, who find it difficult to open up their files to their former enemy." Toon and his associates point to the military intelligence agency (GRU) "as the leading foot dragger," which so far has been even less forthcoming than KGB sources.⁴⁵

Many revelations regarding the nature of KGB holdings have appeared in the press, and information continues to surface about the extent of destruction in KGB archives.⁴⁶ Popular articles such as, "Was Oswald A Spy, and Other Cold War Mysteries" will continue in the press as selected documents are gradually released.⁴⁷ Fabricated documents, contradictory evi-

dence, missing or destroyed files, along with documents that were never written—the international espionage thrillers are naturally the most difficult to resolve conclusively with incomplete evidence from files not opened to public research. The doors of the KGB and other intelligence agencies are hardly open to researchers for these subjects, and declassification remains selective. "While there is no law, agencies will guard their secrets to the end," a deputy chairman of Roskomarkhiv explained in an August newspaper account, setting forth a few examples of types of documents—from Wallenberg files to data on radiation hazards—that are still being suppressed, and warning of other destroyed or falsified documents bearing legitimate signatures and seals.⁴⁸

Some Western researchers in Moscow during 1992 have been pleased "by the Foreign Ministry's civility and openness," in comparison with the KGB.⁴⁹ The first serious published survey of holdings in the postrevolutionary Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) appeared in summer 1992.⁵⁰ New regulations for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) declassification and access, published in the United States, promise to conform to international standards.⁵¹ Yet despite

⁴⁵As quoted by Dobbs, "U.S. POW Prober 'Not Satisfied' He Tells Yeltsin," A26. There have been regular complaints from the U.S.-Russian POW/MIA Commission all year about difficulties in obtaining data from archives of security authorities such as the KGB and GRU. See other references in note 9. See also the official report on the American Commission's Moscow activities, U.S. Senate, 103d Congress, POW/MIA's: Report of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, 13 January 1993 (Washington: GPO, 1993), especially pp. 34–38, 428–47.

⁴⁶For example, Ella Maksimova, "Poka arkhivy KGB bez khoziaina, sekrety uplyvaiut na Zapad," *Izvestiia*, no. 20 (24 January 1992): 1, 7. See the reply by the KGB Lieutenant-General Kondrashev, "Arkhivy KGB: To v seifakh, to na raspodazhe," *Izvestiia*, no. 29 (4 February 1992), which was published with editorial comment. Nataliia Gevorkian (interview with Nikita Petrov), "Dos'e KGB stanut dostupnee—poka teoreticheski," *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 8 (23 February 1992): 10; A. Mil'chakov (in interview with Valentin Gordin), "Sed'moi fond KGB—pod kontrol' OON. Tol'ko togda my uznaem vsiu pravdu o sud'be Raulia Vallenberga, Georgiia Markova i drugih zhertv politicheskikh repressii," *Vecherniaia Moskva*, no. 116 (18 July 1992): 4. As the editor explains, earlier articles by Mil'chakov were published in the issues of 18 and 17 February and answers from readers were published 16 March and 9 April.

⁴⁷See David Wise, "Was Oswald a Spy, and Other Cold War Mysteries—The Russian Revelation of Soviet Intelligence Documents Is Answering Old Questions—and Raising New Ones," *New York Times Magazine*, 6 December 1992, pp. 42, 44, 46, and 48.

⁴⁸E. Maksimova, "Poka net zakona, vedomstva budut zashchishchat' svoi 'tainy' do poslednego—schitaet zamestitel' predsedatelia Roskomarkhiva A. Prokopenko," *Izvestiia*, no. 177 (5 August 1992): 3.

⁴⁹Gati, op-ed letter, 7.

⁵⁰V. V. Sokolov, "Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii—istorikam," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 4 (1992): 156–65.

⁵¹Odd Arne Westad, "The Foreign Policy Archives of Russia: New Regulations on Declassification and Access," *Society for the History of American Foreign Policy Newsletter* 23 (June 1992): 1–10; William Taubman, "Russian Foreign Policy Archives: New Regulations on Declassification and Access," *AAASS Newsletter* 32 (September 1992): 1–2. The regulations as printed are undated, but Taubman's introductory note refers to a communication from the MFA on 14 April 1992. As of the end of December 1992, the regulations had not been revised to take into account

such announcements and the new Russian law on access, archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense largely set their own declassification procedures. Even as the concept of "state secrets" becomes more liberal at the MFA, where the lengthy declassification procedure—whereby Russian diplomats must read and physically stamp every document to be declassified, regardless of its date—is so expensive to operate that no more than 10 percent of the previously secret files have been declassified since the process began in 1990. An International Academic Advisory Group created in March 1991 under the auspices of the Norwegian Nobel Institute is advising the MFA on the utilization of its archives and developing contacts with Western funding sources to aid the archives in creating reference facilities for researchers.⁵² Already the archive has prepared a list of its fonds that is available to researchers in the reading room, and a guide is being prepared for publication.⁵³ It is to be hoped that such efforts can overcome roadblocks to more efficient declassification of files and reference facilities. A model has already been set by the now completely open prerevolutionary Archive of Russian Foreign Policy (AVPR), for which a published guide listing *opisi* in each fond is now available, albeit only published in microfiche.⁵⁴ Yet, contrary to practices in many Western archives, MFA officials argue that

opisi in AVP RF that may include even only a few references to still classified files cannot be communicated to researchers.⁵⁵

The Presidential (or Kremlin) Archive, which takes the prize for "Russia's most secret archive," is still off-limits to the general public, although an occasional researcher has penetrated it and a detailed survey of its treasures recently appeared in print.⁵⁶ Seals have been broken on many of the "special files" but, according to November 1992 estimates, "two thousand 'top-secret folders' [*osobyie papki*] more are waiting to be . . . [brought] into the daylight."⁵⁷ Neither the thirty-year rule decreed by the Supreme Soviet nor the fifty-year declassification rules instigated by Roskomarkhiv have resulted in the promised transfer of older records—with many of the most highly sensitive files from CPSU sources—to their designated archival centers. Roskomarkhiv chair Pikhoia has been leading the efforts in the Kremlin Archive with the Russian Presidential Commission for the Declassification of Documents Issued by the Central Organs of Power of the USSR and the CPSU. The extent to which they were actively pursuing the matter of

the law on access passed by the Supreme Soviet in June, and MFA officials are not prepared to adopt the automatic declassification scheme in the Roskomarkhiv "Temporary Regulations" cited above.

⁵²Grants to the Norwegian-based International Archives Support Fund have come through from the MacArthur Foundation and from the Japanese businessman Masakazu Shiiki of the Sanyo Shinpan Finance Company, Fukuoka, Japan, according to the IASF coordinator, Sven G. Holtmark, of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.

⁵³"Spisok fondov Arkhiva vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, predstavliami v chital'nom zale Arkhiva" (Moscow: AVP RF, [1992–93] 64 pp.

⁵⁴See below and the publication data in note 137.

⁵⁵As reported to me by the chief of the MFA Historical Records Administration, I. V. Lebedev, in July 1992. Since the MFA traditionally used a system of separate fonds (rather than separate *opisi*) for secret files from a given agency, declassification will necessarily involve complicated reprocessing with rearrangement of fonds and complete revamping of *opisi*, if they are ever going to be available to researchers. Earlier, the MFA blamed the lack of a second copy as reason for not communicating *opisi*. Now that the IASF grant will cover the cost of photocopying the *opisi* for reading room use, MFA officials cite the high cost and delays of declassification as another excuse.

⁵⁶See the recent and most detailed account of the archive and its contents in a newspaper story by Petr Akopov, "Khranilishche 'kremlevskikh tain,'" *Rossiiskie vesti*, no. 62 (26 September 1992): 2. See also the earlier article by Evgenii Kuz'min, "Kto kontroliruet proshloe, tot kontroliruet budushchee—" *Sekretnyi arkhiv* Gorbacheva," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, no. 3 (15 January 1992): 11.

⁵⁷Lev Bezmyenskii, "Greatest Secret of the Party Secretaries," 25, 27.

release of the "Demons from Pandora's Box," was apparent in a government newspaper interview with Pikhov in July and in an hour-long television interview in December.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, it was also apparent that the first order of demons were being chosen "to load political pistols," as one Moscow journalist put it, for proceedings of the so-called Constitutional Court.⁵⁹ Yet by the end of the year, with the conclusion of the court proceedings, even "many of the documents that were made available to the court remain inaccessible to independent researchers."⁶⁰ Rosarkhiv planned to publish all documents presented to the court, but that may become less possible with the recent more conservative turn on the political scene. Besides, even if the plan goes through, specialists realize already that, given the politicization of the selection process, such a publication, despite its many revelations, would hardly satisfy scholars

or the public at large, and it could intensify criticism of the declassification commission.

That some progress has been made during the year in getting scholars into the archives, even for Cold War topics, was apparent at the conference "On New Evidence on Cold War History," held in Moscow 12 to 15 January 1993, sponsored by the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, D.C.) and on the Russian side by the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) and the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The subsidy for the congress from the American side helped encourage research by Russian scholars, and there were many more Russian participants than Western ones at the Moscow meeting. Both sides were encouraged by what they hoped would be a real beginning on scholarly research in post-Second World War topics. Yet the fear in Moscow that foreigners are getting the upper hand in Russian archives is so strong that when the American conference chairman, William Taubman, referred to the problem in his opening remarks, the Moscow newspaper *Nezavisimaia gazeta* turned his remark around out of context and headlined its own story about the conference as if Taubman were admitting that were the case.⁶¹

Such concerns in Russian public attitudes overlook the more important fact that many archives outside of Russia are still more open for research on Cold War topics than are archives in Russia itself, for foreigners and Russians alike. Although American scholars returned from Moscow

⁵⁸ Svetlana Shevchenko (interview with R. G. Pikhov), "Demony iz iashchika Pandory," *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, no. 161 (16 July 1992): 2 (the article appeared in an alternate issue of the newspaper dated 11 July, p. 7); (English translation in FBIS-SOV-92-136-9 July 1992).

⁵⁹Reference is to the front-page story by Betsy McKay, "Archive Revelations Load Political Pistols," *Moscow Times*, no. 29 (12 June 1992): 1; see also Dobbs, "The Opening of the Politburo's Archives," p. A32. D. Babich ("Generalnyi bumazhnykh kar'erov," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, no. 197 [21 October 1992]: 2) quotes Roskomarkhiv Deputy Chairman Vladimir Kozlov, with a similar analysis. Some Western journalists went so far as to "accuse the Russian government of using its control over the communist party's records to manipulate information and undermine its political opponents." See Vera Tolz and Julia Wishnevsky, "The Russian Government Declassifies CPSU Documents," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1 (26 June 1992): 11. The report featured the press conference (5.VI.1992) held by representatives of the Russian Presidential Commission for the Declassification of Documents Issued by the Central Organs of Power of the USSR and the CPSU to announce the release of documents for the Constitutional Court.

⁶⁰Dobbs, "Court Backs Yeltsin on Party Ban," p. A27. As quoted above (note 13), the author recalls that Yeltsin had earlier promised public display of the court documents, but such plans have been side-tracked. See the first of the series of published registers cited above (note 14).

⁶¹Leonid Kannenberg, "'Inostrantsy imeiut vozmozhnost' ispol'zovat' vashi arkhivnye dokumenty ran'she vas,' skazal svoim rossiiskim kollegam, otryvaia 12 ianvaria mezhdunarodnuu knoferentsiiu, amerikanskii professor-istorik Uil'iam Taubmen," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, no. 6 (14 January 1993): 4.

with optimism after signing a joint appeal to President Yeltsin for opening the Presidential Archive, the congress nevertheless, according to some reports,

made clear . . . how much Soviet-era material remains closed. Almost all the documents reflecting decision-making at the highest level, the Soviet Politburo, remain in the Presidential Archive, a closed collection under the control of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The archives of the KGB and the Army's General Staff also are sealed to outside use. Russian scholars presenting papers on the Cuban missile crisis, for example, complained that they still have no direct knowledge of the Soviet leadership's deliberations.⁶²

The fact remains that despite the progress during 1992, serious scholarly research on many sensational topics, even from the 1920s and 1930s, will have to await a more stable political situation in the country, more progressive laws on state secrets and freedom of information, and more wide-scale declassification of top-level Party, military, and intelligence files.

Financial Catastrophe

Recently, many of the most vociferous researcher complaints have stemmed from "commercial" rather than political considerations. Allegations about the sale of archival information, rather than democratically opening archives for free public research, stem largely from the disastrous economic situation in Russian archives. Such problems are aggravated in a

country lacking the tradition of archivists as well-paid government servants and lacking the concept of the "public domain" to which government records in most Western democracies legally belong. Today archives, not unlike libraries and museums, are being given little more than minimal staff salaries from the state budget, and hence inadequate living wages for archivists in the face of an inflationary economy. Several major archives were on strike in 1992 because there were no funds for wages at all for several months. In that connection Russian archives may have something to learn from Western administrative techniques that function with much smaller staffs and more efficient management. In fact, the availability for research of much recent documentation depends, and in the foreseeable future will undoubtedly continue to depend, more on economic than on political factors.⁶³

As is evidenced in the recently issued regulations, Rosarkhiv leadership is committed to opening formerly declassified files and the finding aids that go with them to an extent never before possible. But out of severe financial necessity, they are also legalizing licensing fees for the sale of commercial usage and publication rights, along with various search fees and other service charges. The state is tightening its grip on free public services. And to make matters worse, the hard-currency funds that archives are able to raise from newly imposed service fees are taxed by the government at a staggering 40 to 50 percent. The government cannot find adequate funds to support the newly opened archives and is unwilling to exempt them from the high taxes on fees they collect, and the even higher taxes on the hard-currency income

⁶² See, for example, Daniel Sneider, "Archives Reveal Cold-War History—Soviet Documents Reveal a Moscow That Often Had to Be Prodded into Action by Its Client States," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 January 1993, p. 8.

⁶³ Some of my remarks in this section were previously published in an interview by T. I. Bondareva, "Nel'zia v odnochase razreshit' vse problemy, — schitaet doktor Patriitsia Grimsted," *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 5 (1992): 104–10.

they manage to exact from foreign researchers, joint ventures, and publication projects.

Many Russian archives are faced with catastrophe resulting from the lack of financial resources to repair their roofs and leaking pipes, light their work areas, and provide basic archival security and reader services. The director of RTsKhIDNI brought back a gift case of light bulbs from a recent foreign visit when word went out that his stacks were dark, but not all archives are so lucky. The financial crisis is intensified by the new demands on archives to accession the staggering quantity of contemporary records awaiting processing. Indeed, many crucial recent records from all branches of government and economic activity in the liquidated ministries and agencies of the former Soviet Union face destruction for want of storage space in the Russian state archives designated to receive them. Roskomarkhiv learned in the summer of 1992 that in its facility in the Far North, which stores security copies of the most vital records in all state archives, preservation microfilm was in danger of total loss because no coal would be available to heat the building the following winter.

Archives in Moscow, which are more in the public eye, are often much better off than those in the provinces, but Russian archives everywhere are going to need massive financial and technical aid if the documents they house are going to be preserved for future generations. Modern facilities are desperately needed for a number of unique archives, but in St. Petersburg, it was the local Party archives that won out over Pushkin and Russian science—as is evidenced by the catastrophe in Russia's oldest continuous archive, the St. Petersburg Archive of the Academy of Sciences, and the priceless manuscript wealth in *Pushkinskii dom*.⁶⁴

Reference Search Fees and Sale of Licenses—Problems of “Commercialization”

The increased interest at home and abroad in the newly opened Russian archives has outpaced state resources to provide the archival services needed. At the same time, Russian archivists have inherited a tradition started under Gorbachev whereby archives, along with other public service institutions, were forced to find ways to advance self-financing (*khozraschet*) in the face of decreasing state budgets. Despite some speculations abroad, no state archive under the State Archival Service is permitted to charge entrance fees for any category of researchers. Furthermore, archival leaders have also been anxious to preserve the traditional Soviet socialist right of individual Russian citizens to apply to archives in person or by mail for free attestations of school, military service, or work records in connection with pension rights and other official sociolegal functions, despite the growing cost of such services to the archives. The financial situation of state archives has reached such a crisis that a fee structure for such inquiries may have to be considered, but many archivists who were raised in the Soviet socialist tradition have difficulty contemplating such an eventuality.

Citizens in Western democracies, by

tastrophes: Alla Repina, “Tonna partprotokolov i odin dnevnik Vavilova. Chto vyberet Smol’nyi na pamiat’ ob epokhe pravleniia partii? To i sokhranit . . .,” *Chas pik*, 25 June 1992; Aleksei Zhuravlev, “Pochemu bzvuntovalsia stareishii arkhiv Peterburga . . .,” *Chas pik*, no. 29 (20 July 1992): 12; and Vladimir Kozhin, “Zakroetsia li Arkhiv Akademii nauk? Eto vopros vremeni,” *Nevskoe vremia*, 22 September 1992. Regarding the sad fate of the world-famous archive of the Institute of Russian Literature (*Pushkinskii dom*), see Marina Kornakova, “Razzhaloan v riadovye,” *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 23 (7 June 1992): 22—“After the extinction of the fire in the Leningrad Library of the Academy of Sciences, Academician Likhachev remarked that if the fire in BAN could burn on for two days, *Pushkinskii dom* would burn up in twenty minutes.”

⁶⁴See the most recent tragic stories about these ca-

contrast, are quite accustomed to paying nominal fees for certified copies of personal vital-statistics, school, and military service records, and search fees or recording taxes for property or land tenure titles. But few such inquiries or sociolegal functions in the United States or Canada, for example, are handled by the National Archives, because such documentation is not centralized in government archives and a completely different situation therefore prevails. The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense in Podol'sk noted that official individual inquiries were over the one-million mark for the year 1991; subsequently, with the complications following the collapse of an all-union army, that figure is likely to rise. But inadequately paid pensioners or war invalids in today's Russia certainly cannot be asked to carry the burden, yet neither can state archives afford to pay international postage rates for inquiries from Estonia or Kazakhstan. Russian archives are also overburdened today by the massive work involved in rehabilitating victims of repression, but no archivist is going to request fees for the documents needed by such individuals or their families.

Increased sociolegal inquiries and official search obligations are understandably a major drain on Russian archives, but should students and visiting foreign scholars be forced to pick up the tab? Reciprocity and international norms need to be considered, even in this transitional period of financial catastrophe. The idea of national or even local state archivists charging fees for basic reference service or search fees for otherwise poorly indexed documents is difficult for domestic and foreign researchers to accept, especially for students and academic researchers on limited budgets. Journalists (especially foreigners) are balking as well—and justifiably staging strong protests—over practices involving the sale of public information, even for citation purposes, and fees for interviews with

public officials that defy the principle of reciprocity. Rosarkhiv officials may deny some of the more outrageous accusations made in a story entitled “Russia to Open Archive but Foreigners Must Pay,”—in this instance regarding the sale of information to the *Toronto Star*—but the matter of search and license fees aggravates archival use in the “new” Russia.⁶⁵

Russian archival leaders have justified the imposition of thematic search fees in their most recent regulations, according to which even researchers who come in person to the archives may be forced to pay archivists to locate documents on the subject of their research when they are unable to identify the files they need themselves. According to a 1983 UNESCO study, access to archives is regarded as a right for citizens in the legislation of most countries, and so it remains in Russia. There are no charges for readers' passes in archives in Russia, although some countries, such as France, have imposed minimal entrance fees at the Archives Nationales and the Bibliothèque Nationale. Initial advisory reference service is also free of charge in Russia and will undoubtedly remain so, especially given the lack of researcher-oriented reference facilities within many Russian archives.

A number of archives, faced with rising costs and inadequate public budgets, have nevertheless considered charging search fees. In principle, such a practice is in keeping with international practice, as the UNESCO study considers “the principle of charging payment for research on behalf of a member of the public perfectly ‘acceptable.’”⁶⁶ However, the incident mentioned

⁶⁵Betsy McKay, “Russia to Open Archive but Foreigners Must Pay,” *Moscow Times*, no. 28 (9 June 1992): 3.

⁶⁶Michel Duchein, *Obstacles to the Access, Use and Transfer of Information from Archives: A RAMP Study* (Paris: UNESCO, 1983), 30–31. Regarding the former Moscow Party archive, see note 36. The Canadian National Archives recently was forced by the legislature to back down when the matter of fees for

earlier in the local Moscow Party archives, whereby archivists were withholding research access to documents and then charging the researcher inflated search fees for ferreting out this very information on his behalf, is a practice Western archivists could never condone, and it is clearly against the spirit of the June Roskomarkhiv regulations in Russia.

In more practical terms, the lack of adequate researcher-oriented reference facilities and finding aids in many Russian repositories requires closer personal interaction between archivist and researcher—and more searching time—than would be the norm in archives in other parts of the world. Most important, the lack of annotated lists of *opisi* in most archives makes it difficult for researchers to orient themselves in large *fondy* and to determine which *opisi* may need to be consulted. In many archives, severe restriction on the number of files a researcher can order in one day and the slow pace of delivery of ordered files (sometimes as long as a day or two) complicates research efficiency. Such limitations may be understandable, given persisting antiquated regulations in Russia requiring archivists to hand-count the folios in each file before delivery, but this makes it impossible for researchers to browse speedily through a large quantity of files that are inadequately described in *opisi*.

Reference problems are most acute in contemporary archives under the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs (not under direct Rosarkhiv administration) where researchers are still not given access to *opisi* and internal card files. In many instances, Russian archival *opisi* provide much more thorough file-level descriptions than are

found in archives in many other countries. Yet the Soviet tradition that foreigners should not be permitted to see *opisi* and that politically or ideologically sound archivists should do the searching and choosing for researchers has not been completely forgotten in such high-security archives.⁶⁷ With transfer to a market economy, some archivists seem to think it follows that they should be paid for such didactic services.

A few foreign researchers on tight schedules (and especially journalists less accustomed to long hours in archival research) may be willing to pay archivists to find relevant documents for them. But others understandably protest when they are asked to pay hard-currency fees for a thematic search or for copies of documents that they have not chosen themselves but that archivists have prepared for them in advance, especially when they have no assurance that they are being shown all the relevant documents.

Fees for xerox-type copies, photocopies, or microform copies of archival documents are normal the world over. Researchers in the U.S. National Archives can use self-service (and self-supporting) photocopy machines for 10 cents a page. Most archives in other countries understandably do not trust researchers to prepare for themselves copies of unique archival documents and hence require that they order copies prepared by the archival staff.⁶⁸ But usu-

reference service was raised. The French Archives Nationales have started charging fees for readers's tickets. Considerable controversy arose in England in the summer of 1992, when the Public Record Office considered the imposition of admission charges for readers' tickets.

⁶⁷For example, the miles of Second World War records in the U.S. Federal Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, totally lack file-level inventories and often lack even adequate labeling on boxes, forcing researchers to search through trucks of boxes for the documents they need. In contrast to the Russian situation, however, there are no archivists available to search, even if a researcher were prepared to pay, but delivery is fast and researchers are permitted an unlimited number of boxes a day.

⁶⁸The Canadian National Archives charges 25 cents a page for copies prepared by a contract xerox service. In Germany researchers can order photocopies for 50 pfennigs per page (30 pfennigs for students), and microfilm per frame costs are much less.

ally no additional fees beyond those for copying are required, even for publication rights, because all government documents are considered legally in the public domain and hence freely accessible by all with no copyright restrictions. Most state archives in the West also have no limits on the percentage of a fond or file that may be copied. Accordingly, foreign researchers, and Russians as well, are now complaining about new Roskomarkhiv licensing charges, high copy fees, and the restrictions that no more than ten percent of a given fond may be copied.⁶⁹

One of the most controversial elements of the June Roskomarkhiv regulations is the right and obligation of state archives (and Rosarkhiv itself) to sell licenses for publication rights at home and abroad to all documents in state archives. Russian archivists justify such charges as one of the few means they have to raise funds for their survival. This practice replaces the earlier Glavarkhiv practice introduced under perestroika of requiring researchers to pay an "information value" charge for all photocopies on top of the copying fee. Rosarkhiv now permits academic researchers to obtain copies without the right to publish them for more reasonable charges; yet even for straight copying, some archives are still charging between 50 cents and \$1 a page. Some archives have contracted services with commercial firms that charge even higher rates but net the archives reasonable profit and the facilitation of foreign orders.⁷⁰ Some may delight in the fact that copying services are now available, but it is hardly encouraging to potential scholarship when a Russian university student from St. Peters-

burg cannot come to Moscow and obtain a copy of the text needed for a senior thesis from the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (RGALI, formerly TsGALI) because the copy would cost the student three or four times his or her yearly stipend.⁷¹ Some repositories, especially many not administered by Rosarkhiv, will make copies available only on the condition that foreign researchers pay additional high fees for publication rights in hard currency, although the new Rosarkhiv regulations have brought regress to some such grievances.⁷²

Academic researchers have reason to believe they are getting the raw edge in a pirate economy when a high Moscow archival official in January 1992 was quoted as responding to an American scholar, "Why should I bother to talk to you, when German television will offer us \$20,000 for one file?"⁷³ After a year of foreign protest, photocopy prices in some major Moscow archives appeared to be lower by the fall of 1992, but the problem of outrageous copy fees persists in many repositories. Even some facilities under the Ministry of Culture still abide by old Soviet restrictive provisions,

⁷¹The example cited was reported by the son of a Moscow colleague in the spring of 1992.

⁷²In the spring of 1992, two American graduate students were asked to pay \$3 per page (albeit with the right of publication) for several hundred photocopies needed for dissertation research from the Archive of the Russian Geographic Society in St. Petersburg. The charge was documented in a letter to IREX. When a copy was submitted to Roskomarkhiv, an official inquiry from Roskomarkhiv brought reconsideration of those charges. Several foreigners have reported that the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA) charges five dollars a page, which includes the right of publication; rarely are foreigners permitted to obtain copies for less, since archivists assume they may later decide to publish the documents anyway.

⁷³James G. Hershberg, coordinator of the International Cold War History Project at the Woodrow International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., was quoted in an article by Ellen K. Coughlin, "Newly Opened Archives of Former Soviet Union Provide Opportunities for Research Unthinkable a Few Years Ago," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 30 (27 May 1992): A8.

⁶⁹Some archives—RTsKhIDNI, for example—are limiting copies to 10 percent of an individual file as well.

⁷⁰Among several commercial firms offering services abroad, Urbana Technologies, Inc., in an advertisement in the *AAASS Newsletter*, offers copies at \$1 per page with added service charges of \$50 per order and \$45 per archive.

but they give "commercial" excuses. In the Tolstoi Museum in Moscow, for example, in the spring of 1992 archivists chose what limited manuscripts an American professor was shown, and he was not permitted to see opisi or internal card catalogs, allegedly because of the archive's own publication plans in the unspecified future. Some repositories have gone so far as to refuse to furnish free data about their holdings for reference publications.⁷⁴ Many such practices conflict with the spirit and letter of new Rosarkhiv regulations, but regulations are difficult to enforce for repositories not under Rosarkhiv jurisdiction, especially when many researchers have neither the time nor the inclination to initiate grievance procedures. Researchers are understandably distressed at the growing commercial spirit that requires bargaining and protests over what should be normal archival services.

One of the leading offenders has been the former CPSU Central Committee facility at Saryi Ploshchad near the Kremlin. As Politburo files are declassified, TsKhSD tends to favor "the highest bidder" among journalists who are prepared pay for the right for first revelations, even though they have no intent to publish the entire text. For example, the *Washington Post* journalist Michel Dobbs, who was cited above, paid \$400 for recently declassified Politburo minutes regarding the Afghan war in the fall of 1992, even though he was not publishing them in their entirety.⁷⁵ A more

serious scandal broke out in that archive at the time of the Cold War History Project Conference in January 1993 with the insinuation that the archival staff were themselves personally selling licenses abroad for sensational materials and, in some cases, even those that had not yet officially been declassified. The deputy director in charge of publications, for example, was accused in the sale of documents regarding activities of the Communist Party in Finland, part of which were published in a sensational collection in October 1992, and Moscow newspapers were requesting further explanation from Rosarkhiv.⁷⁶

For those familiar with archival practices in Western democracies, the sale of licenses and publication rights, aside from serving as a breeding ground for scandal, also raises legal problems of archival "ownership" of the records they house, of state control over intellectual property or content, and of copyright and the extent to which copyright can or should be assigned to government documents. The sale of "exclusive licenses" for rights to state documents (and CPSU documents to the extent that the Party assumed state functions) as a practice conflicts markedly with the concept of public domain in Western democracies and the rights of free and open public usage of all records created by government agencies. The sale of "exclusive" rights to documents in public custody also raises the issue of legal ownership of former state and CPSU records. Does the present archive or nonarchival state agency holding those records "own" them to the extent that it is legally in a position to negotiate and sell rights to

⁷⁴In connection with the collaborative directory sponsored by IREX and Rosarkhiv, several St. Petersburg museums under the Ministry of Defense initially refused to return questionnaires on financial grounds for lack of reference fees; after a Rosarkhiv appeal to the Ministry, the matter was eventually resolved. In October 1992, the director of the Archive of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, during a personal visit with a Roskomarkhiv colleague, refused to furnish us data regarding Academy archival holdings without financial consideration.

⁷⁵Dobbs, "The Opening of the Politburo's Archives," *Washington Post*, 15 November 1992, p.

A32. According to Rosarkhiv officials, there should not have been a charge for these materials. The Moscow Times article cited in note 65 mentions other more blatant examples of charges to journalists from the same archives.

⁷⁶See the editor's query to Rosarkhiv published together with the letter from Anatolii Smirnov, "Sensatsiia ili insinuatziia?" *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, no. 9 (15 January 1993): 7.

what in most countries would be considered part of the national heritage or the public domain? And what about nationalized property that was legally confiscated from private individuals or firms and from community institutions or organizations under laws and decrees (or arbitrary police action) of a predecessor regime? Do archives that themselves serve as state agencies where such materials reside have the right of “ownership” and of commercial sale or transfer of copyright? And what about captured records, KGB-seized manuscripts, and documents that might be the subject of pretension by successor states? To be sure, some suppressed personal papers, memoirs, and hitherto unpublished literary manuscripts may need to be protected as “private” property, once laws defining and pertaining to private property are promulgated and clarified. The proposed Russian archival law posits the distinction between state and nonstate parts of the Russian Archival Fond but says nothing about “private” archives. This follows from the fact that the underlying legal concept and legal definition of private property have yet to be enacted—or reestablished—in Russian law, let alone tested in court in a post-Communist regime. Many of the legal principles involved are murky in Russia because the whole distinction between public and private property—and rights of ownership—has itself not yet been legally clarified.

Unfortunately, the new regulations authorizing the sale of licenses for publication and other publishing prospects by archivists themselves have given rise to a new category of “commercial secrets,” which in some instances can keep files closed to public scrutiny or favor those willing to pay. For example, the Foreign Intelligence Service, as heir to the KGB First Main (foreign intelligence) Division is admittedly required by contract to hold back files on high-interest subjects for up to at least ten years, now that they have a million-dollar

advance for a ten- or more volume series of documentary publications to be issued (in English, German, and Japanese) by Crown Publications, signed in June 1992. In this case, however, an additional legal question arises, as to whether or not FIS has the right (1) to assume and sell copyright to documents themselves (without any archival benefit to the State Archival Service), due to the Yeltsin presidential decree in August 1991 that transferred jurisdiction of former KGB archives to Roskomarkhiv (enacted before the KGB was split); and (2) to thereby close the files to public access for up to ten years before the series of published volumes appear.⁷⁷ “Was it a legal transaction between the former Soviet government and the firm?” asked Adam Ulam, retired director of Harvard University’s Russian Research Center. “Can a single publishing firm get exclusive rights to that kind of document? It goes a little bit against accepted rules.”⁷⁸ The issue is more complicated for researchers in that the records of foreign intelligence operations, now controlled by FIS, have not been turned over to the State Archival Service; neither the files, nor their finding aids are open to normal research access in any case; revelations depend on what that still highly politicized agency decides to divulge or withhold from the public in any given case.

The sale of exclusive publication licenses in other archives now open to the public, including those under the State Archival Service, could also potentially affect access and the extent of freedom of public information. In contrast to Crown Publications, the recently-signed agreement between RTsKhIDNI and Yale University Press does

⁷⁷See the terms of the Crown contract cited by S. Drozdov, “Skandal” (interview with Nikolai Arzonnikov). Such points were also raised in the article by Nataliia Gevorkian, “Dos’e KGB stanut dostupnee—poka teoreticheski,” 10.

⁷⁸Quoted by Frank, “The Spies Out in the Sunshine,” C8. See notes 43 and 44.

not require that the files involved be closed to researchers until their publication. Yet as the senior editor in charge of the Yale project explained, the fact that Yale Press is required to pay high publication license fees (even as a nonprofit university press) forces it to "protect its investment" and impose at least some measure of restrictions on RTsKhIDNI's right to furnish copies to other researchers—and particularly journalists—or to permit them to publish quotations from the documents prior to the Yale publication. And since all of the documents have yet to be chosen for publication, this "exclusive" publication agreement could also potentially have an adverse affect on the open use of numerous files.⁷⁹

Russian archivists have false hopes and illusions, if they think Western publishers are going to be able to produce and sell profitably many volumes of annotated published documents or that sky-high royalties for reference publications will serve to increase income for the archives. A few Western academic publishers may find foreign publishers prepared to contract for limited high-interest twentieth-century documents. There are undoubtedly some earlier suppressed political or literary manuscripts that will be of publishable wide-scale historical or literary interest. A few high-interest archives, such as hitherto closed military or foreign policy archives, may find foreign publishers ready to offer high-royalty agreements for guides. But these are going to be the exception, not the rule; if many others follow suite, their distribution will undoubtedly be limited in a period of

shrinking academic library budgets. Serious documentary publications are not popular sellers in the West and, like almost all archival reference publications, usually require subsidies. A few nonprofit organizations or academic presses may find subsidies to help prepare scholarly publications or reference works or underwrite printing costs. Important as they are in making hitherto secret historical sources or reference information about them widely available abroad, their long-term profits are likely to be meager for Russian archives—particularly given the even higher editing and publication costs abroad. Russian archivists are gradually learning to deal with Western business and publishing practices, but within the new Russian economic chaos the search for survival in terms of even minimal hard-currency advances or hoped-for royalties for scholarly and reference work may often compromise professional norms and public service reference functions.

Even more alarming are the accusations that the new "commercial" archival practices lead to increased staff corruption. The possibilities of misuse of the new fee structures are great, particularly in a country lacking a tradition of strict controls on public servants. Russian archivists are surprised to hear that archivists in the U.S. National Archives are not permitted by law to perform paid research, to publish documents for profit, or to accept consultation fees, and that similar practices pertain in state archives in many other Western countries.⁸⁰ There are more possibilities for abuse when foreigners are asked to pay hard currency in cash, so that archivists can avoid the 50 percent (or higher) tax they have to pay the state on hard-currency income re-

⁷⁹See the Yale press release dated 27 July 1992. The Yale agreement has been characterized in the press much more positively than the KGB-Crown project; see, for example, the article by Gayle Feldman, "Yale Signs Multi-Book Deal with Russian Archive," *Publishers Weekly*, 8 August 1992. Jonathan Brent, senior editor at Yale University Press, assured me that files are to remain open to researchers and, if citations are required, efforts will be made to accommodate reasonable requests from scholars.

⁸⁰The recently approved "Code of Ethics for Archivists," adopted in the Fall 1992 meeting of the Council of the Society of American Archivists, shows the difference in the concept of archival service between Russia and a Western country such as the United States.

ceived through official banking channels. But this situation is only one small example of inadequate basic reform in the nationwide economic infrastructure with which archives have to contend during the present uncertain transitional period.

Western journalists are often too quick to report instances of suspected corruption out of context. A front-page story in the *Wall Street Journal* recently implied—in a perhaps all-too-cute journalistic ploy—that a friendly tea-time gift of Danish butter cookies could be considered a bribe that provided access to recently declassified prerevolutionary police files.⁸¹ Despite the sensationalist headline, “Information Flow Is Freer in Russia, but It Is Not Free,” the respected mouthpiece of American business is duly concerned with the corruption they see emerging in the new commercial practices in Russian archives. The fact that a TASS translation of the story could turn the butter cookies into a purely monetary bribe may give further cause for reflection. Yet the innocence of butter cookies for normal friendly tea breaks with Russian archivists does not obliterate other allegations of bribes and unprofessional practices on the part of underpaid archival staff.

The front-page attention is a new departure for Russian archives that may hopefully help increase outside world support for their preservation. The day after a follow-up story in the English-language *Moscow Times*, entitled “Soviet History for Sale—Scholars Lose out at the Archives,” in which a Roskomarkhiv deputy director decried their sad financial condition,⁸² the American team investigating the POW/MIA cases agreed to provide a new photocopy

machine and computer installation for Roskomarkhiv to assist their efforts. (Japanese, German, and other foreign governments had long since provided computers, software, and peripherals for their own more extensive POW investigations.) But at the same time, the negative press coverage reflects more ominous problems that may have an adverse effect on potential support and beneficent aid from Western sources.

Rosarkhiv leaders are duly angered at the Western cries of “commercialization” and alarmed by the allegations that bribes rather than regulations are determining access, and that scholars are crying out in face of misused search fees, delays in the communication of documents, spiraling photocopying charges, and files that are closed for pending or anticipated exclusive publication rights. The *Wall Street Journal* story appeared only a week before the new Roskomarkhiv access and research regulations came off the press. Those regulations authorize search and copying fees and the sale of licenses for publication, but they also suggest a grievance procedure that should be used by future researchers. Within days after the *Wall Street Journal* story and its Moscow sequels reached them, Roskomarkhiv appointed a commission to investigate the allegations and found them all unsubstantiated or grossly exaggerated. The transition of Roskomarkhiv into a professional State Archival Service has considerable promise and may serve to turn the tide of criticism. But given the uncertainties of the current political and economic situation and public attitudes, many worry about the extent to which reform will really be implemented or enforceable.

Concepts of public service and professional ethics are different in Russia, and it is unrealistic to suggest the imposition of Western value systems within the current economic chaos. Without full understanding of the Russian situation, foreigners may sometimes be too quick to cry “foul” or view every foreign gift of equipment and

⁸¹Andrea Rutherford, “Information Flow Is Freer in Russia, but It Is Not Free,” 1, A14.

⁸²V. P. Kozlov was quoted as saying, “We only have enough money to pay our staff,” and further worried that “Soon we will have no lights and our phones won’t work,” as quoted by Judi Buehrer, “Soviet History for Sale; Scholars Lose Out at the Archives,” *Moscow Times*, no. 39 (17 July 1992): 1.

supplies as an attempt to curry favor or buy exclusive rights. Yet, in Moscow today, without hard currency it is often impossible for an archive to find the necessary paper or toner for the copy machine. If the archive is lucky enough to have one at all, it is usually thanks to hard-currency income or a beneficent gift from a foreign institutional "friend" with whom they were able to negotiate a joint project or a barter arrangement for needed archival copies. Indeed, gifts of photocopy machines or computers—or microfilm or toner cartridges—to Russian archives out of beneficence, or in exchange for copies within the framework of the current barter economy, need to be encouraged and not be considered bribes by either side. As long as such equipment or supplies are otherwise beyond their reach, and if when presented they are open to all who need them, such contributions could help the archives immeasurably and accordingly help future researchers using their facilities.

Concerns about such problems in the West are reflected in the academic as well as popular press. For example, the Social Science Research Council issued a position paper in the fall of 1991, expressing fears about potential inequities of access and lack of reciprocity in connection with new commercial practices in Russian archives and other research institutions. As was pointed out by at least one critic, such ethical issues are not always clear cut, and the self-righteous tone of the published version was not entirely appreciative of the catastrophic economic realities in Russia.⁸³ To encourage further consideration of these issues, the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) devoted a special session at its 1992 Phoenix con-

vention to the subject of commercialization of scholarship. Various points of view were expressed by panelists and in responses from the audience—from those who wanted to draft general statements of principle or guidelines for scholars in the field to those who were ready to storm the convention exhibit booths of high-priced vendors considered to be profiteering at the expense of scholarship. Yet there appeared to be a general recognition that there is little individual scholars or less affluent universities could or should do to regulate the growing pains of a nascent market economy in a country so long cut off from the West. At the same time many expressed the need to encourage Western assistance and support of progressive forces in Russia with the hope that they would prevail and encourage democratic access to research resources with normal and reasonable fees for essential services.⁸⁴

Bonanza or Beriozka?

Researchers from the West may laud the opening of Russian archives, and many Western publishers and research centers have found the means to cater to heightened public and academic interest in archival materials from the tragic decades of Soviet rule. Yet the new opportunities for more normal distribution of microform and documentary publications of archival materials abroad have been met within Russia itself by an alarming nationalist backlash that is seeking to limit large foreign ventures. On a higher political level, this attitude reflects more general conservative anti-Yeltsin forces that accuse the current government of selling Russia out to the West.

Recent agreements for the "super project" between Roskomarkhiv and the Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and

⁸³See Steven Solnick and Susan Bronson, "The Toronto Initiative," *AAASS Newsletter* 32 (January 1992): 10-11; and the reply of J. Arch Getty in *AAASS Newsletter* 32 (March 1992): 10. See also the earlier discussion in Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 117.

⁸⁴Published contributions to the discussion and continuation during next year's AAASS convention will appear in the *Slavic Review*, Spring 1993.

Revolution, with participation of the British microform publisher Chadwyck-Healey, have been attacked from all sides, but broader issues are involved. Soon after the initial Chadwyck-Healey project, "Leaders of the Russian Revolution," which involved filming the personal papers of nine prominent leaders was announced in January 1992, negative reactions were voiced in the Moscow press regarding the sale of the "Party's Paper Gold." So unaccustomed are Russians to the sale of archival microform that Russian television news failed to distinguish between the sale of documents themselves and copies, claiming that "secret documents were being sold to England for millions." A more responsible Moscow journalist tried to explain to the contrary: "Some secrecy, some millions!—Microfiches and microfilms of documents . . . are freely available to Soviet researchers in the former Central Party Archive." Among the many points of complaint was the query of one journalist, "What about our CIS neighbors? Party archives after all involve their fate and their history. So why should they be sold to a Western firm?"⁸⁵

Controversy over the Hoover project itself arose even before the final agreement was signed in March 1992. In America headlines proclaimed, "Conservative Think-Tank to Get Soviet Secret Files."⁸⁶ Curiously, criticism of the Hoover project was

taken up most vocally by Iurii Afanas'ev, rector of the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU). Writing in *Izvestiia* in March, he expressed fears that "such a transfer of copied materials" would "move the center for the study of Russian history to the USA—the Hoover Institution." He feared that documents transferred to Hoover might be accessible there even before they were available in Russia and that in the process Russian historians were being given a raw deal. He further wondered whether the Hoover/Chadwyck-Healey agreements would "serve to benefit individual researchers or a private company." He questioned the broader "commercial activities of Roskomarkhiv" with reference as well to a deal with a Florentine publisher involving other documents from the former CPSU archives. He complained about the transfer abroad "of monuments of our most recent history," even before there was an adequate Russian law on archives.⁸⁷ Afanas'ev seemed to be lashing out in all directions, but his harsh criticism of Roskomarkhiv and chauvinistic opposition to large-scale filming of Russian archives is hard to understand in light of his earlier progressive attitudes toward perestroika in history and the opening of archives to scholarship. But he reflects the views of many on the Right that such deals will give Western scholars further advantages over Russian ones, and further widen the gap between Russia and the West in terms of scholarship regarding the Russian and Soviet past.

In a published reply, Pikhovskii corrected Afanas'ev on many facts and defended the

⁸⁵E. Maksimova, "Poka arkhivy KGB bez khoziaina, sekrety uplyvaiut na Zapad," 7; Natal'ia Davydova, "Bumazhnoe zoloto partii," *Moskovskii novosti*, no. 8 (23 February 1992): 10. See further citations and comment in Grimsted, "Beyond Perestroika," (IREX March version), 35.

⁸⁶The story "Conservative Think-Tank to Get Soviet Secret Files" from the *Los Angeles Times* was seen in numerous American newspapers after the Hoover press release dated 10 March 1992. See the Moscow interview with Roskomarkhiv Chairman Pikhovskii, published a few days before the agreement, when rumors were already circulating in Moscow: Ella Maksimova, "Krupneishaia arkhivnaia sdelka s Amerikantsami, kotoroi protivitsia nashi istoriki," *Izvestiia*, no. 57 (7 March 1992): 2.

⁸⁷Iurii Afanas'ev, "Proizvol v obrashchenii s obshchestvennoi pamiat'iu nedopustim," *Izvestiia*, no. 58 (10 March 1992): 3. Afanas'ev repeated this argument in more forceful terms in a May conversation with me immediately after a public meeting where Roskomarkhiv officials presented further assurances to the contrary. Afanas'ev was instrumental in the establishing RGGU in March 1991 on the basis of the Moscow State Historico-Archival Institute (MGIAI).

Hoover agreement as having none of the negative effects Afanas'ev alleged, but his explanations did not quell the storm.⁸⁸ Criticism in the Russian press became more violent following the announcement of the more comprehensive Hoover-Chadwyck-Healey agreement in April, involving microfilming twenty-five million frames in high-level CPSU archives and related records in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF, earlier TsGAOR SSSR). A lengthy article in *Moscow News* in early May queried, "Who, Americans or us, will be the first to receive copies?" The question "Who was gaining what by the three million dollars deal?" was among those left unresolved "in the dark forest of commerce."⁸⁹ "Archives—Everything for Sale," was the headline of another critical article in *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, which again failed to recognize many of the intellectual issues involved.⁹⁰

The initial lack of clarity and decision about what materials were to be filmed was an understandable criticism of the Hoover project. As originally formulated, filming was to embrace documents relating to seven ill-defined topics that were dubbed "the seven sisters" by critics who objected to the idea of selective subject-oriented filming rather than copying entire fonds in respect for their integrity. More recently, Roskomarkhiv and Hoover officials agreed that filming will start with all of the internal inventories (opisi) of fonds in the two CPSU centers and related fonds in the State Archive of the Russian Empire (GA RF). Such

a decision conforms to a professionally sound archival preservation and research-enhancing program, as was recommended by numerous Russian and foreign consultants from the outset. Roskomarkhiv and Hoover specialists accordingly assured the public that high-interest fonds—to be selected by an international committee—will be filmed in their entirety.⁹¹ Roskomarkhiv officials have also tried to point out the positive benefits for archival preservation in providing technical assistance, microfilming equipment, and quality-controlled preservation microfilms for Russian archives, given "the regrettable lack of material and technical resources that prevents Russia from preserving its own archives itself."⁹² Such practical benefits of the project were not appreciated in most of the Moscow press accounts, because many had less tangible concerns that the project was another indication of the loss of Russian control over its own destiny.

"The Archival Bonanza," described by Hoover historian Robert Conquest in the lead article of the May 1992 *Newsletter* of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies reflected positively on the "service to the scholarly community" which Conquest from a Western perspective considered the project was providing.⁹³ Conquest did not answer Afanas'ev and other Russian criticism, but he applauded the new possibilities of documenting many of the controversial and negative sides of the decades of totalitarian rule. Yet he cautioned that even the top

⁸⁸R. G. Pikhoia's answer to Afanas'ev appeared a week later as a letter to the editor: "Fakty i vymysly o 'Rasprodazhe istoricheskoi pamiati,'" *Izvestiia*, no. 65 (17 March 1992): 3. The editor also added corrections that came in from the Italian publisher named by Afanas'ev.

⁸⁹Natal'ia Davydova, "'Delo partii' zhivet i prodaetsia—Shirokaia rasprodazha gosudarstvennykh arkhivov ne mozhet byt' bezrazlichna obshchestvu," *Moskovskie vedomosti*, no. 19 (10 May 1992): 21.

⁹⁰"Arkhivy—Vse na prodazhu," *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, no. 110 (15 May 1992): 8.

⁹¹See the announcement in the *AAASS Newsletter* 32:5 (November 1992): 9.

⁹²See the remarks of V. P. Kozlov, quoted in "Arkhivy—Vse na prodazhu," 8. See also Kozlov's emphasis on this point in an October interview with V. Ignatov, "Sekrety dlia obshchego polzovaniia. Amerikantsy pomogut nam sokhranit' v tselosti arkhivy KPSS, a my otkroem im dostup cherez dollar—k bol'shevistskim tainam," *Moskovskaia pravda*, no. 207 (22 October 1992): 2.

⁹³Robert Conquest, "The Archival Bonanza," *AAASS Newsletter* 32 (May 1992): 1–2.

secret (*sovershenno sekretno*) documents being released from Party archives were still not going to explain many of the highest “word-of-mouth-only” decisions of the Soviet leadership, and he appropriately pointed out that additional revealing research in the years ahead would come from local archives that were not included in the Hoover agreement.

Iurii Afanas’ev, by contrast, emphasized not scholarship but commerce in an article entitled “Archival Beriozka,” catering to a vocal body of Russian opinion that was not ready to open the Russian archival heritage so widely to Western scrutiny. In terms much more emotional than those used in his March article—and with sanctimonious biblical illusions—he argued that the Russian archival patrimony was being sold off too cheaply to the West despite the announced 27 percent royalties for Roskomarkhiv that were to accrue from sales.⁹⁴ Without understanding the terms of the agreement, he showed no appreciation of the fact that large-scale microfilming projects, which are normal in many Western countries, would assist in opening the archives to world scholarship, as Hoover Institution officials had tried to explain in their earlier Moscow press conference.⁹⁵

Pikhoia in a June 1992 interview strongly defended the Hoover’s agreement as serving the interests of Russian researchers by making microfilms from Hoover’s Russian

holdings available in Russia. Furthermore, making films of CPSU documentation available abroad will increase discussion between historians of different national traditions, which in turn “should serve to enrich our knowledge of the tragic decades of Russian and Soviet history.”⁹⁶ But critics still complained that Russia is gaining “too little” of “real” value from the West. They noted, for example, that despite the ostensible monetary contribution and donated equipment, the Hoover Institution has still not offered to turn over the original Russian diplomatic and Okhrana records held in California, which under international archival practice would be defined as official state records and normally subject to restitution.

The controversy continued throughout the summer, as Afanas’ev found more conservative support for his claim that “historians of the Fatherland” should have “the full right of first access to archives of the Fatherland.” Stanford historian Terence Emmons, presenting a well-argued case against Afanas’ev’s criticism, was reminded “of the bad old days when foreign researchers in Soviet archives were systematically refused access to materials that had not been previously used by Soviet researchers.”⁹⁷ Besides, as Roskomarkhiv officials pointed out, there was “no truth” in Afanas’ev’s claim that the project would

⁹⁴ Iurii Afanas’ev, “Arkhivnaia ‘Berezka’—Oka-zyvaetsia, iz nashei istorii mozno kachat’ valiutu,” *Komsomol’skaia pravda*, no. 93 (23 May 1992): 5. The term *Beriozka* (literally, birch-tree) refers to the foreign-currency stores, with choice goods for tourists and other privileged elite, which were found throughout Russia during the Soviet regime.

⁹⁵ Roskomarkhiv representatives promptly pointed out the extent to which Afanas’ev misunderstood and misrepresented the agreement in an open meeting of the Scholarly Council of RGGU attended by many Roskomarkhiv leaders and the directors of the central archives, over which Afanas’ev presided soon after his article appeared. But other opposition from the archives was voiced as well.

⁹⁶ Irina Karpenko, “Vokrug arkhivov idet bessovestnaia torgovlia, schitaet predsedatel’ Komiteta po delam arkhivov pri Pravitel’sve Rossiiskoi Federatsii Rudolf Pikhoia,” *Rossiiskie vesti*, no. 20 (19 June 1992): 2.

⁹⁷ A highly abridged version of Emmons’ reply was published with the headline “Eto napominaet durnoe staroe vremia,” *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 33 (16 August 1992): 18–19 (but only in the Russian edition). The full Russian text of Emmons’s perceptive critique of Afanas’ev’s commentary appears as “‘Ia ne sovsem ponimaiu Vas, gospoda . . .’—O soglashenii Roskomarkhiva i Guvera,” *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 5 (1992): 100–02. An abridged English version appeared as “I Don’t Quite Understand You Gentlemen . . .,” *AAASS Newsletter* 32 (September 1992): 4–5.

close down access to the archives in Moscow or that materials will be available on film which are not already open to researchers in Moscow.⁹⁸ In an effort to present more openly the aims and procedures for the Hoover project and to diffuse criticism, a Russian translation of one of the press releases was published in the Rosarkhiv professional archival journal at the end of 1992.⁹⁹

Unfortunately for the archives, and for would-be researchers at home and abroad, such rising xenophobic and Russian chauvinistic sentiments, and the extent of potential political scandals from archival documents released abroad, have seriously impeded other projects with foreign publishers that might have made additional high-interest twentieth-century archival materials available abroad and might also have significantly assisted Russian archives themselves. In his June interview, Pikhoia defensively explained that Roskomarkhiv was trying to control commercialization and assured the public that the Hoover project was the only major foreign joint publishing project to which Roskomarkhiv had agreed. He should hardly be accused of "selling off the Fatherland," since he had just refused approval of another major project with Research Publications International.¹⁰⁰ In that case, a major Western microform publisher, who had already concluded agreements with the archives involved, was turned away at the Roskomarkhiv negotiating table, although the publisher was prepared to provide considerable technical equipment and to prepare an electronic index for card catalogs and other finding aids in former

CPSU archives, to say nothing of high royalties from potential foreign sales. At almost the same time, Roskomarkhiv leaders broke off negotiations for a French academic consortium to reproduce the Comintern records, which remain of particularly high interest to the European Community. Roskomarkhiv denied the accusation that they want to preserve a filming monopoly with the Hoover Institution and Chadwyck-Healey for central CPSU archives and other high-interest twentieth-century records, but such has been the effect so far. Several other Western publishers were turned off by the difficulty of negotiating with the Russian archives. The archives themselves were highly dissatisfied, in part because most of the negotiations were carried out by Roskomarkhiv without their ongoing involvement. They feared that none of the benefits would come to them, and they resented the fact that, before what had in effect become an "exclusive" deal with Hoover, they had not been free, as they would have liked, to contract for additional filming projects proposed by other publishers.

Russian public opposition to large-scale Western filming efforts is hard for foreigners to understand; however, it has hardly been limited to the Hoover project alone. Similar cries of alarm have come from other sources, causing reconsideration of many other commercially less viable, historically oriented projects. In St. Petersburg, for example, several microfilm publication projects already under contract with the Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA, formerly TsGIA SSSR), including one already publicly advertised to make available key nineteenth-century provincial governors' reports (hardly an undertaking with much potential for profit) evoked considerable opposition among the archive staff, accompanied by accusations that they were selling off the national heritage—much too cheaply at that. Similar arguments in the Scholarly Council of *Pushkinskii dom* in April threatened a planned project to film literary materials in

⁹⁸For example, V. P. Kozlov in an interview with V. Ignatov, "Cherez dollar—k bol'shevistskim tainam," *Moskovskaia pravda*, no. 207 (22 October 1992): 2.

⁹⁹"Kak budet pealizovyyvat'sia soglasenie Roskomarkhiv i Guvera," *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 6 (1992): 108–09.

¹⁰⁰"Vokrug arkhivov idet bessovestnaia trgovlia," *Rossiiskie vesti*, no. 20 (19 June 1992): 2.

that repository where urgent preservation efforts are needed. More recently, Rosarkhiv officials blamed the “current political situation,” when they definitively turned down the Library of Congress efforts to organize preservation filming efforts with surplus U.S. government state-of-the-art microfilming equipment; many Russian archivists were outspokenly resentful of the provision that, in return for permanent use of the equipment and technical assistance, a free copy of the filmed materials would be deposited in Washington, D.C. The offer of much-needed technical assistance may be well appreciated, but culturally conscious Russian archival leaders had to refuse when the aid was tied to the massive copying of Russian archival materials for free deposit abroad with no comparable intellectual or cultural return for Russia.¹⁰¹

Echoing and catering to the conservative outcry, Afanas’ev addressed a parliamentary inquiry to the Supreme Soviet in July 1992 protesting a series of foreign microfilming projects. Most particularly, he helped stir up a major scandal over a project for filming the Ginzburg collection of early Hebraic manuscripts in the Russian State Library (RGB, formerly the Lenin Library), undertaken by the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem (ENUB). Afanas’ev claimed that “the agreement inflicts damage to Fatherland science and state interests. The manuscripts will go into the hands of Israeli scholars. . . . RGB is giving ENUB unique information for free (the world prices for one frame of microfilm is three to five dollars), and at the same time they [RGB] do not have money for reconstruction.”¹⁰²

Actually, as part of the agreement, RGB was receiving quality preservation microfilms of the long-closed Ginzburg collection, as well as computer equipment and cataloging software, and the prospect of an updated, scholarly catalog of the unique collection, and royalties if additional copies of the films were sold—all of which the RGB’s director, Igor’ Filippov, defended as in keeping with international scholarly standards and normal library practices. The head of the RGB Manuscript Division in a supportive interview admitted that the project was a major contribution the development of Hebraic studies, which have long been neglected in the Soviet Union.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, Afanas’ev found supporters for an open petition of protest to the head of the Committee on Culture of the Supreme Soviet.¹⁰⁴ Some of the Manuscript Division staff insisted that RGB should have at least gotten microfilms of Slavic manuscripts held abroad, including those in Israel. Even the Hebraic specialist in the library spoke out against the project, which was also strongly attacked with anti-Semitic overtones in the nationalist press and by *Pamiat’* affiliates.¹⁰⁵ When the Ministry

ninka’ opiat’ imcet nepriatnosti s evreiskikh rukopisei—Fond Ginzburga okazalsia Rossiiskim dostoianiem,” *Kommersant*, no. 31 (27 July–3 August 1992): 26. As Filippov explained to me in October 1992, the *Kommersant* reporters made it sound as if the library was getting only second-hand equipment and no other benefits, which was hardly the case. The filming project was completed in September 1992.

¹⁰³Viktor Deriagin, “Kak my prishli k soglashiui s Ierusalimom” (interview by Glev Kuz’mín), *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, no. 23 (5 June 1992): 13. In the past, Deriagin has often been accused of conservative leanings, so his support was all the more noteworthy in this case.

¹⁰⁴RGB director Filippov kindly furnished me with a copy of the open petition addressed to F. D. Polevov, signed by sixteen scholars and scientists.

¹⁰⁵Dmitrii Slobodianiuk, “Optom i nedorogo,” *Rossiskaia gazeta*, no. 93 (22 April 1992): 8; Viktor Iurlov, “Okhotniki do chuzhikh rukopisei—Ocherednoi skandal s utratoi natsional’nykh tsennostei iz Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi biblioteki,” and “Vместо

¹⁰¹Negotiations continued for a year, but the project was definitively rejected by Rosarkhiv during the visit of Librarian of Congress James Billington in December 1992. The Library of Congress is now offering the equipment to other archives, including those under the Russian Academy of Sciences and in Ukraine.

¹⁰²Dmitrii Slobodianiuk and Iurii Pankov, “Le-

of Culture was asked to investigate, none of the specialists consulted found any problems with the agreement, but that hardly convinced the critics.¹⁰⁶

A public meeting in Moscow in October 1992 sponsored by the Fund for Cultural Initiatives (the so-called *Fond Kultury*) proved to be a forum for open debate on some of these issues. A vocal segment of conservative ultranationalist extremist opinion opposed to foreign copying projects and wanting to limit Russian archives to Russians was countered by a few more Communist-oriented critics who, in Soviet social service tradition, opposed any form of commercialization or fees for services. The ultranationalist voices were loudest and most intractable. Many such public outbursts are sadly indicative of the basic lack of Russian understanding and sympathy for Western archival and library microform publishing ventures and practices with respect to copy services. First, the idea that allowing copies of archival materials to be circulated abroad "threatens Russian national interests" appears as a curious blend of traditional insular and currently resurgent Russian chauvinism coupled with a reformulation of the earlier Soviet prohibition on large-scale comprehensive microfilm orders and the patrimonial "keep the archives under Soviet/Russian control" mentality.¹⁰⁷ Even otherwise progressive Russian

archivists have been heard to make remarks such as, "If foreigners want to see our archives, let them come to Moscow." In terms of twentieth-century holdings, there is an added degree of traditional Russian xenophobia and fear of compromising still-powerful Soviet nomenklatura if Pandora's box is further opened to world scrutiny.

As early as 1968, the International Council on Archives had recommended "abandoning all a priori formal restrictions," and called on archives "to satisfy all scientifically justified requests for microfilms whatever may be the purpose of the research and even if large-scale operations are involved."¹⁰⁸ To the contrary, Soviet archives traditionally refused to film entire fonds for researchers, or even entire files within fonds, and it was always difficult for a scholar to get permission to copy an entire manuscript book or literary manuscript. As mentioned above, the latest June 1992 Roskomarkhiv "Regulations for the Use of Archives" still continue the earlier Glavarkhiv restriction that limits orders for copies to no more than 10 percent of a given fond.

The Russian public appears unaware that archives and libraries the world over consider it normal practice to comply with international educational interests and research needs in filming and distributing microform copies of high-interest materials, such as Foreign Office and census records and important literary or cultural manuscript masterpieces. Russian archivists are unaccustomed to practices whereby U.S. and Canadian National Archives, for example, deposit complete microform copies of many frequently used record groups in regional

poslesloviia, Peredaite vashemu ministru . . . , Gost' sovetoval, preduprezhdal i dazhe ugrozhal . . . ,"
Rabochaia tribuna, no. 67 (9 June 1992): 3. Aleksei Timofeev, "Kliuch upravleniia mirom—Rukopisi ne goriat, no strasti vosplameniaiutsia. . ." (interview with I. V. Medvedev), *Den'*, no. 28 (12–18 July 1992): 2.

¹⁰⁶When queried about his assessment in an October public meeting in Moscow under the auspices of the Russian Fund for Culture, Evgenii Kuz'min, chief of the division of libraries in the Ministry of Culture, noted that he saw no reason why the ministry should concern itself with or interfere in the matter since the project was a normal library function. Kuz'min repeated the same point in a personal conversation with me in October 1992.

¹⁰⁷Such was part of the explanation given by Rus-

sian State Library Director Igor' Filippov in a conversation with me in October 1992 soon after the meeting mentioned in note 106.

¹⁰⁸See "Resolutions Based upon the Report of the Working Group on Liberalization," *Actes du VI^e Congrès international des archives* (Madrid, 3–7 Septembre 1968), published as *Archivum* 18 (1970): 213–15.

archival centers, so that researchers can consult them without having to travel to Washington or Ottawa. It is hard for them to believe that they do not need Soviet-style bilateral agreements to purchase (for any convertible currency) many of the Hoover Institution Russian holdings or those from the Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, which are readily available for sale in their entirety on microfilm. The U.S. National Archives has undertaken more extensive filming and hence many more of its records are openly available for low-cost purchase on film than is the case with other national archives. By contrast, however, the type of chauvinist public outcry against such practices that has surfaced in Russia would be inconceivable in most countries of the world.

The blatantly *commercial* component in the public opposition is a more recent development in Russia, which (while tainted by the isolation of Russia from Western market relationships) again shows a lack of understanding of normal practices abroad. Cries that the heritage of the Fatherland is being sold abroad below value may be seen as an unfortunate outcome of the economic catastrophe currently facing Russian cultural institutions. Understandably, archives may want to seek redress of their economic woes with higher foreign currency income from long-suppressed files. Nevertheless, it is sad to see culture becoming a commercial pawn. As a progressive official in the Ministry of Culture recently remarked, "These people are treating archives and libraries as diamonds and gold instead of culture, as if they should be sold to the highest bidder."¹⁰⁹ It is ironic that in the capitalistic United States, the Roskomarkhiv-Hoover agreement is seen as a scholarly "bonanza," while Russians complain

that it is an unprofitable "beriozka." Perhaps there should be more concern on both sides that the archival legacy of the nation is up for sale at all rather than considered part of the public domain, exempt from taxes, and open freely to all—including a variety of responsible commercial initiatives, as would be the case in the United States and other Western countries.

Particularly misleading are the still grossly inflated figures of world prices for microfilms that Afanas'ev and others are quoting in criticism of foreign filming efforts. Major U.S. libraries report a median price of 13 cents per frame for negatives and 20 cents per running foot (60 cents per meter) for positive copies.¹¹⁰ The extent to which Roskomarkhiv itself was ill-informed about such matters was apparent in a memorandum on commercial practices prepared by what is now called the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for Documentation and Archival Affairs (VNIIDAD) on the basis of earlier Glavarkhiv "Information Bulletins" devoted to this subject, which misleadingly quoted unbelievably high prices—from \$10 to \$80 per microfilm for "valuable information" and as high as \$3,000 to \$8,000 per microfilm for "unique information."¹¹¹ Without supporting documentation, and with the mention of Sotheby's in the text, one can only presume that the compilers were confusing the sale of

¹¹⁰According to a recent report prepared by the University of Illinois Library and communicated to me. Some American libraries add a \$4 charge for the reel and box and perhaps a \$5 to \$10 handling or service charge per order. A few European libraries are charging as high as 25 cents per frame, which also reflects the fall of the dollar on international currency market.

¹¹¹Spravka o poriadke predstavleniia prava ispol'zovaniia arkhivnykh dokumentov v zarubezhnoi praktike i ob opredelenii tsen na arkhivnuu informatsiiu." R. G. Pikhov gave a copy of this misleading document to me in June. The memorandum draws on analysis and figures published in the earlier Glavarkhiv, *Nauchno-informatsionnyi biulleten*, no. 7 (1991), which also presents many misconceptions about Western archival practices in this area and is replete with examples taken out of appropriate context.

¹⁰⁹Chief of the Library Division of the Ministry of Culture, Evgenii Kuz'min, in conversation with the author.

original documents with microfilm copies, which might also be the origin of some of the outlandish figures quoted by Afanas'ev and others.

In his reply to Afanas'ev, Emmons quite correctly cited the figure of \$23 per 100-foot (33 meter) roll that the U.S. National Archives presently charges for microfilm regardless of content (approximately 23 cents per *foot* or 2 cents per *frame*). Indicative of the rampant misinformation and lack of reality with which Western academic market conditions are viewed in Moscow, when part of the Emmons article was printed in *Moscow News*, the figure came out as \$23 per *frame*!¹¹² Certainly Roskomarkhiv needs better general advice from abroad regarding commercial practices in national archives and feedback regarding budgetary possibilities of the university library market, particularly in an era of academic budget cuts and public library economic problems throughout the world.

Afanas'ev and others who want to push prices and royalties higher and higher fail to reckon how few research and university libraries in Great Britain, France, or Poland, for example, to say nothing of Ukraine or Estonia, could afford the high cost of films from commercial publishers, especially if the royalty rate for the Hoover project were pushed higher than 27 percent.¹¹³ While the Russian press says the

archives have sold out too cheaply, others fear that such high royalties will limit circulation and make films unavailable to all but the richest universities. Certainly (without reduced price arrangements or subsidized presentation copies) they will be out of reach for the former Soviet republics and Communist countries of Eastern Europe who most need them. As to copies for former Soviet republics, the question needs to be addressed to Rosarkhiv rather than to the Hoover Institution or Chadwyck-Healey, since under the filming agreement, Rosarkhiv retains the right of distribution and sale for Soviet successor states. Accordingly, some republic-level archivists fear that politics as well as economics may be expected to play a role in provisions for official copies for the former Soviet republics.

Be it a bonanza or a beriozka, all of these developments must nonetheless be seen as part and parcel of the general catastrophic economic situation in which Russian archives, libraries, and other cultural and academic resources of the country all find themselves, now that they are no longer subsidized by the Soviet system. Some problems arise, too, from the long isolation of Russian archives from the rest of the world with archivists who must now face the growing pains of a nascent market economy without experience in Western-style business and publishing relationships and without a viable financial infrastructure with which to deal with the outside world.

Most of the Western archival filming efforts proposed are hardly "commercial" in the sense of selling off national cultural treasures at Sotheby's or Christies', or peddling publication rights of KGB files to a sensation-hungry press or Hollywood producers. If filming projects are handled

¹¹²Emmons, "Eto napominaet durnoe staroe vremia," 18-19.

¹¹³Hoover officials point out that, unlike purely commercial projects, where the publisher must pay production costs, the Hoover Institution is assuming all such costs (including the microfilming equipment itself to be donated to Roskomarkhiv), which is why they are able to offer such high royalties. As apparent in press releases, "the Hoover share of royalties is to be placed in a fund to promote future exchange activities." The U.S. National Archives, by contrast, is permitted by law to receive only 10 percent royalties above production costs, including microfilms produced from its files by outside publishers, which helps hold the current price ceiling of microfilms to \$23 per

roll and to extend the public circulation of its micro-filmed records.

professionally, with quality control and accompanying reference aids and with academic specialists as advisers, they can at one and the same time assist in

1. providing preservation copies of important fonds and their finding aids.
2. providing master films so that they make available to former Soviet republics authentic, low-cost depositary copies of relevant fonds legitimately due them under international archival practice.
3. acquiring new technology for the archives and training in its use.
4. making available for sale (at reasonable fees) copies of high-interest microforms—both finding aids and files themselves—to foreign and domestic research libraries.

This latter provision would immeasurably help the announced responsibilities and objectives of the State Archival Service, which are to provide more open and wider access to Russian archives and their finding aids to world scholarship as a public service, to preserve original archival records and manuscript treasures of the national heritage, and to provide a source of income and technical assistance to the archives without having to recover their own filming costs. Given the continuing high interest in Russian archival holdings throughout the world, encouragement of filming projects in the library and archival realm, such as is normal in the West, is a small price to pay for cultural preservation, increasing appreciation of Russian history and culture, and encouragement of international scholarship in the field.

Captured Records/Archival *Rossica* Abroad

Recent revelations about records captured during and after the Second World War and held in Moscow are affecting Russian relations with major European govern-

ments and further serving to pull down the walls of Russian isolation from the West on the archival front. In response to the spread of news about the extent of captured records long held in secrecy by Soviet authorities,¹¹⁴ governments and private organizations have been sending missions to Moscow to try to identify and recover their long-lost archival treasures. Most such records are confined to the so-called Special Archive (*Osobyi arkhiv*), which in June 1992 was renamed the Center for the Preservation of Historico-Documentary Collections (*Tsentr khraneniia istoriko-dokumental'nykh kollektsii*; TsKhIDK). But some groups of captured records and scattered documents—particularly those from socialist sources—were transferred to other archives, including the former CPSU archives. Accurate identification of the holdings and their provenance has been proceeding through negotiations and consultations with archivists from many countries.

Most numerous are the records of German and Austrian origin, totaling some 1500 different fonds. These include Nazi party, administrative, police, and wartime occupation records. In addition there are many fonds of socialist, Masonic, and Jewish agencies collected from all over Europe for

¹¹⁴ See the earlier discussion in Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 108–09, which includes references to relevant publications through the end of 1991, including Moscow newspaper accounts starting in 1989 that have confirmed the extent of captured records of foreign provenance; see also Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, "The Fate of Ukrainian Cultural Treasures," 72–79. See especially the newspaper account by Evgenii Kuzmin, "Vyvesti . . . Unichtozhit' . . . Spriatat' . . . Sud'by trofeinykh arkhivov" (interview with Patricia K. Grimsted), *Literaturnaia gazeta*, no. 39 (2 October 1991): 13; and E. Maksimenko, "Arkhivy frantsuzskoi razvedki skryvali na Leningradskom shosse" (interview with A. S. Prokopenko, former director of the Special Archive and then deputy chairman of Rosarkhiv), *Izvestiia*, no. 240 (9 October 1991): 8. See also the popularized article by Prokopenko, "Dom osobogo naznacheniiia (Otkrytie arkhivov)," *Rodina*, no. 3 (1992): 50–51.

special Nazi research centers. A report by a German historian on the TsKhIDK holdings appeared in April 1992, and a preliminary list of fonds with emphasis on those from Germany and Austria, prepared by two German archivists, was published in July 1992.¹¹⁵ The Belgian Archive and Museum of the Socialist-Labor Movement devoted a special summer issue of its journal to an illustrated account of its own and other Belgian collections recently identified in Moscow.¹¹⁶ An unauthorized, cursory guide appeared in Germany later in 1992.¹¹⁷ A cursory English-language list of fonds with some introductory notes about the archive was published in America.¹¹⁸

The return of some sixty Dutch collections held in the Special Archive in Moscow was already assured in the spring of 1992. The archives include some files from the International Institute of Social History and its Paris subsidiary, although other files from these collections that were transferred in the 1950s to the Institute of Marxism-

Leninism are still being identified and prepared for transfer.¹¹⁹ The goodwill involved in the return of Dutch archival materials has already brought several grants of aid for Russian archives from Dutch archivists.¹²⁰ There still has been no published listing of the French records now held in Moscow, including the massive records of pre-1939 French intelligence authorities that were found in Czechoslovakia and brought to Moscow by the personal order of Beria in 1945, although an agreement for their restitution to Paris was signed in November 1992.¹²¹

The Russian State Archival Service is committed to returning all such records to their rightful country of origin, according to accepted international procedures. In some cases, however, Russian archival authorities are trying to negotiate in exchange the return of displaced Russian holdings, or microfilms of Russian migr papers abroad.¹²² The long period of Soviet rule following the Revolutions of 1917 and the Cold War

¹¹⁵ Wegner, "Deutsche Aktenbestände im moskauer Zentralen Staatsarchiv," 311-19; Kai von Jena and Wilhelm Lenz, "Die deutschen Bestände im Sonderarchiv in Moskau," *Der Archivar* 45 (1992, Heft 3): 457-67.

¹¹⁶ *AMSAB Tijdingen*, n.s. 16 (Summer 1992), extra issue: *Mission to Moscow. Belgische socialistische archieven in Rusland*.

¹¹⁷ G tz Aly and Susanne Heim, "Das Zentrle Staatsarchiv" in Moskau ("Sonderarchiv"), *Rekonstruktion und Bestandsverzeichnis verschollen geglaubten Schriftguts aus der NS-Zeit* (Düsseldorf: Hans-Beckler-Stiftung, 1992). While the guide now represents the most thorough coverage of the archive, it is not without many errors and inaccuracies, including the brief introduction; although it cites the fond number, and number of opisi and dela for each fond (except French fonds), it fails to provide inclusive dates. See also the German research report by Wolfgang Form and Pavel Poljan, "Das Zentrum für die Aufbewahrung historisch-documentarischer Sammlungen in Moskau—ein Erahrungsbericht," *Informationen aus der Forschung* [Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien](Köln) 20: 7 (October 1992): 1-8.

¹¹⁸ George C. Browder, "Captured German and Other Nations' Documents in the Osoby (Special) Archive, Moscow," *Central European History* 24 (1992): 424-45.

¹¹⁹ "Scripta Manent," *Bulletin of Central and East-European Activities* (International Institute of Social History), no. 2 (August 1992): 3-4; "Semper Manent," *Bulletin of Central and East-European Activities*, no. 3 (September 1992): 4.

¹²⁰ See "Aid Program for Russia Under Way," *Bulletin of Central and East-European Activities*, no. 3 (September 1992): 1-2.

¹²¹ The first published reference to the extensive French holdings was the Grimsted article and interview cited above (note 114), which was subsequently confirmed in an interview with the former director, Anatoli Prokopenko. See the subsequent French newspaper accounts, Thierry Wolton, "L'histoire de France dormait à Moscou" (interview with Anatoli Prokopenko), *L'Express*, 21 November 1991, pp. 82-83. See also "Les archives secrètes du 2e Bureau sont demandées une nouvelle fois à la Russie par Paris," *Le Monde*, 13 February 1992; Laurent Chabrun, "La France retrouve ses archives secrètes," *Le Parisien*, 4 September 1992, p. 8; Jacques Isnard and Michel Tatu, "Moscou accepte de restituer 20 tonnes de documents des Deuxièmes bureaux," *Le Monde*, 14 November 1992, p. 6.

¹²² See, for example, the statement to this effect by R. G. Pikhov, "Sotrudnichestvu s zarubezhnymi partnerami—ravnopravnuu osnovu" (interview by A. V. Shavrov), *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 2 (1992): 15.

confrontation of the last fifty years has meant the forced emigration and dispersal of many archival materials from and relating to Russia and other nations of the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, Russian archival leaders are assigning a high priority on the international front to the location and description of archival Rossica abroad and to the preparation of a comprehensive bibliography of the relevant finding aids describing such holdings that have already been produced in Russia and abroad. However, relatively few official records of Russian provenance that could be the subject of legitimate claim remain abroad, and most of those that were plundered from Soviet lands during the Second World War were either retrieved by Soviet authorities or returned by the Western allies.¹²³

The United States is also directly involved in issues of captured and displaced records of Russian or former Soviet origin, but all these cases have yet to be resolved. In 1989, the United States handed over to the Soviet Union the extensive records of prerevolutionary Russian consular authorities that had operated in various cities of the United States and Canada, but parts of the records from prerevolutionary imperial Russian Embassies in Washington and Paris still remain on deposit at the Hoover Institution.¹²⁴ Early in 1992, the U.S. National Archives assured Roskomarkhiv that hold-

ings from the former Smolensk Party Archive held by in Washington, D.C., would be returned later in the year. These materials constitute less than half of the Smolensk records seized by the Germans from Smolensk in 1944 and taken to the Nazi Center for the Study of Bolshevism in Silesia. Captured by the Western Allies in 1945, they have remained ever since at the National Archives.

The promised return of the Smolensk Archive to Russia has now been at least temporarily halted, however, as a result of linkage in the U.S. Congress to the unresolved claim for the return of the Schneersohn Collection of books and manuscripts, which belonged to the Jewish Habad Hassidim community in Lubavichi (Smolensk Oblast) currently held by the Russian State Library (former Lenin Library) in Moscow. That collection had been transferred to Moscow for safekeeping during the First World War, and after the revolution it was nationalized and turned over to the Lenin Library.¹²⁵ In January 1992, fifty-two senators appealed to President Yeltsin for the transfer of the collection to the heirs of the Lubavichi Hassidic community leaders now resident in Brooklyn, New York. The U.S.

¹²³ For an overview of this project and some of the issues involved, see Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, "Archival Rossica/Sovetica Abroad—Provenance or Pertinence, Bibliographic and Descriptive Needs," *Cahiers du Monde Russe*, 34 (1993): 431–80. A Russian version appears in *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 1 (1993): 20–53.

¹²⁴ Published excerpts from correspondence at the time of deposit in 1934 suggest that at least the Washington Embassy records were transferred to Hoover with the understanding that they should be returned to their homeland when a responsible government was restored. See John H. Brown, "The Disappearing Russian Embassy Archives, 1922–1938," *Prologue* 14 (Spring 1982): 5–13. Brown quotes from the documents involved in the transfer of the records to Hoover.

¹²⁵ See the Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty background report prepared by Julia Wishnevsky, "Controversy over Schneersohn Collection Still Unresolved," dated 6 February 1992. See also the lengthy report by then-Senator Gore read into the *Congressional Record-Senate* (31 March 1992): S 4537–40. A Russian court initially suggested the Schneersohn materials should be transferred to a Jewish community center in Moscow, but prohibited export; another Russian court reversed the lower court judgment for a compromise solution. There was a firebomb in a Moscow Jewish center and considerable anti-Semitic slander in reaction to the numerous protest demonstrations; and in February, Hassidic representatives staged a protest in Moscow and forceably entered the library. There has been extensive coverage of these events in the Moscow press. The U.S. Congress added a rider to the Freedom Support Act (PL 102-511, 24 October 1992) prohibiting assistance to any state institution unlawfully holding books or documents of historical significance that are the property of U.S. citizens (section 202).

Congress prohibited the return of the Smolensk Archive, and the Russian Supreme Soviet in retaliation prohibited transfer of the Schneersohn Collection; so the bitter conflict continues. From a legal standpoint, linkage of the two cases appears ill-advised because the Smolensk Archive involves the plundered property of a wartime ally. Issues in the Schneersohn case are much thornier: At stake are the principles first, of a precedent-setting restitution of nationalized private property (or in this case abandoned community property) and second, the alienation of cultural treasures from the country of their creation and long-time storage. But such issues have been obscured and further complicated by uncompromising Hassidic demands on the one side and high-level political involvement on the other, coupled with blatant anti-Semitic reactions in Moscow.

The issue of location, return, and exchange of records held abroad is further complicated and its importance increased in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Issues involving their copying and appropriate access have been high on the agenda within the increasingly fragile Commonwealth of Independent States and its nonparticipating neighbors. A general agreement on the subject was signed by CIS archival representatives in Moscow in July 1992, and there has been further discussion in archival circles, but without reference to many of the international precedents or to United Nations' resolutions and activities on the subject.¹²⁶ The International Council

on Archives (ICA) has designated the issue for its Round Table topic in 1995—honoring the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War—and a published article by ICA Executive Director Charles Kecskemti has set forth some of the issues in terms of established international precedents.¹²⁷ It is to be hoped that by the time of that meeting, many more of the issues will be clarified, if not resolved, through further dispassionate discussion and that more displaced records will be returned to their rightful homes.

Reference Facilities and Information Needs

The opening and use of Russian archives, the discussion of captured and displaced records, and the planned survey of archival Rossica abroad all require the professional description of archival holdings and bibliography of their finding aids to make them accessible to researchers. There are no current guides or even basic lists of open fonds for many archives. Nor have full lists been compiled of all the captured foreign archival and library materials dispersed in many Russian repositories. The names of Russian archives listed in the 1992 ICA directory are already out of date, and that directory includes only those state archives that were previously administered by Glavarkhiv, mentioning none of the many important archives under other agencies, such as those administered by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, State Security, and the Russian Intelligence Service, to say nothing of those formerly under the CPSU and the Russian Academy of Sci-

¹²⁶ "Soglashenie o pravopreemstve v otnoshenii gosudarstvennykh arkhivov byshevo Soiuzu SSR," Moscow, 6 July 1992, article 3, published in *Vestnik arkhivista*, 4, no. 10 (1992): 3-5. See also the earlier Minsk protocols: "Predlozheniia gruppy ekspertov gosudarstv-uchastnikov SNG dlia resheniia voprosov, sviazannykh s pravopreemstvom v otnoshenii gosudarstvennykh arkhivov," Minsk, 23.IV.1992 (published in Roskomarkhiv, *Informatsionnyi biulletin'*, no. 3 [1992]) See the discussion of these issues in Grimsted, "Archival Rossica." See also V. V. Tsa-

plin, "O prave sobstvennosti na arkhivnye dokumenty v diplomaticheskikh aktakh dorevoliutsionnoi i sovetskoi Rossii," *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, no. 4 (1992): 20-25.

¹²⁷ Charles Kecskemti, "Displaced European Archives: Is It Time for a Post-War Settlement?" *American Archivist* 55 (Winter 1992): 132-40.

ences among others.¹²⁸ Researchers will have trouble even recognizing the former Central Party Archive (TsPA) under its new Russian acronym RTsKhIDNI, or its counterpart for post-1953 records, under the acronym of TsKhSD. Reference aids to make such information more accessible to researchers planning on-site visits or attempting to order copies from abroad are a high priority, but an expensive one, which is not aided by the catastrophic financial situation of Russian archives and libraries. The tremendous foreign interest in Russian archives has brought some measure of foreign sponsorship with outside funding (and Rosarkhiv willingness to use it) for reference efforts over the past couple of years, intensified after the presidential decrees nationalizing CPSU and KGB archives in August 1992.

The first or top-level reference priority needs to provide potential researchers with readily accessible, current data identifying all public (and, as they develop, nonstate and private) archival repositories in the Russian Federation, characterizing their holdings, access provisions, and research possibilities, together with an annotated bibliographic listing of their existing finding aids. The first priority is listing general guides and then providing a more comprehensive bibliography of specialized publications or internal finding aids that provide more detailed information and that could assist in research planning. Such a directory, as the frequently updated output of an ongoing computerized database in English

and Russian versions, is already under way to orient the potential researcher, with a full listing of all archives and with advice on where to apply and what to expect. Sponsored by the International Research & Exchanges Board, this Russian-American collaborative project is being undertaken on the Russian side by the State Archival Service together with the participation of the State Public Historical Library (GPIB) in Moscow and the St. Petersburg Branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. An initial English-language version of the directory was published in loose-leaf format (as automatic output from the database) in July 1992, and a second for the ICA congress in Montreal in September of that year.¹²⁹ An updated version dating from February 1993, and more complete parallel English and Russian versions should be ready for publication by the end of 1993.¹³⁰ While the depth of description of individual repositories does not replace the longer annotations of holdings in recent VNIIDAD directories,¹³¹ it provides much more current, researcher-oriented data for many more archives under various controlling agencies, a bibliography of general finding aids, together with a correlated index of all previous repository names. Eventual plans call

¹²⁹ *Archives in Russia*, 1992.

¹³⁰ *Archives in Russia*, 1993.

¹³¹ N. M. Andreeva, L. M. Babaeva, T. M. Bulavkina, et al., compilers, *Gosudarstvennye arkhivy SSSR. Spravochnik*, edited by V. N. Avtokratov, F. M. Vaganov, I. V. Volkova, et al., 2 vols. (Moscow: "Mysl'," 1989). Based on data from the end of 1986, it is obviously now considerably outdated by subsequent developments. The companion volume, *Dokumenty Gosudarstvennogo arkhivnogo fonda SSSR v muzeiakh, bibliotekakh i nauchno-otraslevykh arkhivakh*, edited by N. V. Avtokratov, F. M. Vaganov, I. V. Volkova, et al. (Moscow: "Mysl'," 1991 [1992]), is based on 1 January 1987 data. Nonetheless, its description of archival holdings in many museums and libraries—many described in print for the first time—remains useful. Cross-references to the coverage in these VNIIDAD-produced directories is indicated for all repositories in *Archives in Russia*, 1993.

¹²⁸ *International Directory of Archives/ Annuaire international des archives* (Munich, London, New York, Paris: K. G. Saur, 1992; *Archivum*, (38):71–78 (English), 88–102 (Russian). The editors excuse themselves that it was impossible to obtain current information about Russian archives and those of other former Soviet republics that are listed in this directory (with only Russian and awkwardly translated English names) on the basis of data communicated by Glavarkhiv in 1991. They are listed under the Commonwealth of Independent States, although the Baltic republics are listed separately.

for the database itself to be available on-line for constant updating and international network access.

The second crucial level of reference access ideally would involve a fond-level locator file, so that researchers would know where they may find the agency records, manuscript collections, or personal papers they seek. Over the decades of Glavarkhiv centralized control, obligatory fond-level reporting requirements resulted in an all-important central catalog of fonds, covering state archives throughout the former USSR, with rudimentary elements of computerization. The catalog was never intended for public research access, nor did its rubrics conform to international standards for fond-level descriptions. The latest Glavarkhiv methodological recommendations from the era of glasnost¹³² showed some improvement in descriptive plans, but they still advocated continuation of traditional Glavarkhiv Soviet standards.¹³³ Many researchers today would demand more sophisticated descriptive rubrics, with more extended series-level coverage, at least for large fonds. The fact that all obligatory reporting for non-Russian republics was recorded *only* in Russian translation makes the catalog virtually useless today for non-Russian areas. In planning their more sophisticated national computerized fond-level archival information system, Ukrainian archival planners have already abandoned the old Glavarkhiv central fond catalog because of its basic inadequacies for any serious research or archival location purposes.¹³³

Central CPSU archival authorities initiated a similar reporting requirement for Party archives in the mid-1980s, but it hardly got under way. Other independent archival agencies, such as the Academy of Sciences and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Internal Affairs, had some measure of central information control over their fonds. The extent to which these collected data could be revised for reuse today as a starting point for a national information system within Russia needs further study. In any case, Russian descriptive rubrics will need to be standardized and brought up to international norms for all archives, and they will need to be expanded to embrace holdings in archives that were not part of the Glavarkhiv system.

During the past decade, a commission on archival descriptive standards under the International Council on Archives has been trying to reconcile various international archival descriptive systems into a format that could assist better international communication of reference data. Russian archivists, as well as those from other former Soviet republics, have long been cut off from such efforts, but it is to be hoped now that many of them have been accepted for ICA membership they will also be in a position to participate in planning descriptive standardization.

One off-shoot of the Hoover-Roskomarkhiv project has been the offer of technical reference assistance and planning for entry of Russian fond-level descriptions in the Research Library Information Network (RLIN). The extent to which necessary and

¹³² See N. M. Andreeva, I. N. Volkova, L. G. Kuza, et al., compilers, *Sozdanie i vedenie sistemy katalogov gosudarstvennykh arkhivov CCCP. Metodicheskie rekomendatsii*, edited by V. N. Avtokratov (Moscow: Glavarkhiv, 1989).

¹³³ See the appended chart of prospective descriptive rubrics and sample fond-level descriptions in *Arkhivna ta rukopysna Ukrainika. Materialy rozshyrenoi mizhvidomchoi narady po obhovorenniu Derzhavnoi prohramy "Arkhivna ta rukopysna Ukrainika"* Kyiv,

17 zhovtnia 1991 roku, edited by Ol'ha Todiiichuk, Vasyl' Ul'ianovsk'yi, and Hennadii Boriak (Kiev: Instytut ukrains'koi arkhieohrafii AN Ukrainy, 1992; "Naukovo-dovidkovi vydannia z istorii Ukrainy," no. 18; "Problemy edytsiinoi ta kameral'noi arkhieohrafii: Istoriia, teoriia, metodyka," no. 1). To make matters worse, Russian translations were often presented as awkward, Sovietized-Russified renditions of republic-level institutions rather than authoritative, bilingual renditions of original-language names.

ideally desirable Russian descriptive rubrics should correspond precisely to US-MARC-AMC standards or be maintained in MARC format is another issue that is being analyzed.¹³⁴ Ultimate international compatibility and communication are important goals, and it is crucial to build on standard widespread former Soviet Union-wide usage. But to achieve that goal, some adaptation and compromise on all sides will undoubtedly be necessary to transfer (and translate) data into viable norms that are compatible with individual republic information and linguistic needs but that are also readily and easily accessible to researchers in different languages, archival traditions, and cultural contexts.

Yet even before a comprehensive, computerized fond- and series-level catalog can be achieved on a nationwide level, researchers here and now need basic lists of fonds within individual archives. Many such reference works have been prepared in Russia over the years in the form of comprehensive guides (*putevoditel'*) or short fond-level directories (*kratkii spravochnik*) for individual repositories, traditionally the backbone of an archival reference system. Under Glavarkhiv, guides were produced for most state archives, but since 1970, the quality and detail of most such productions

fell markedly, and their inadequate distribution grossly hampered access to information for researchers at home and abroad. None of the many repository-level guides produced in the last two decades measured up to the minimal standards for many rubrics in published UNESCO recommendations.¹³⁵

Given the more open attitudes and democratization of research access, archivists today realize the importance of providing researchers with fond-level data, but printing costs have skyrocketed. Serious scholarly and reference publications are hit the hardest, as the Russian publishing and book-distribution scene is in shambles. With the breakdown of centralized Glavarkhiv control and the inadequacy of its previous nationwide reference planning for open research reference access, Rosarkhiv has as yet been unable to come to the rescue for reference publications. As a result, many individual archives have been scrambling for various and competing foreign sponsorship and publication arrangements. Unfortunately, given the economic situation and increased publication costs, important archival guides that have not found foreign sponsorship remain unpublished. For example, the seventh volume of the series of guides to the Central State Archive of Literature and Art, which covers many recently II declassified fonds, including those of émigré origin, still remains only in typescript.

On a substantive level, the archival reference situation has given rise to a variety of ad hoc and often makeshift solutions on the part of individual archives or interarchival projects. With the lack of earlier researcher-oriented reference standards, and the isolation of Soviet-area archivists and information planners from international

¹³⁴ The Hoover Institution has offered Russia access to the RLIN international library/archival database as a "spin-off" of the microfilm project mentioned above. The introduction of Russian descriptive records into RLIN would obviously be of tremendous interest to Western researchers (and a boon to RLIN), but significant negotiation will be required to adapt and translate optimal Russian descriptive rubrics to standardized MARC-AMC format in a way that would be intelligible to researchers and archivists both in Russia and abroad. Indeed, as many Russian archivists have recognized, the RLIN format (with USMARC and MARC-AMC rubrics) would require a significant transatlantic and transcultural sea-change if it were adequately to serve interested researchers at home and abroad as a basis for a Russian national archival fond- and series-level information system. Most would reject Library of Congress subject headings as being inadequate for searching and reference access in Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe.

¹³⁵ See Franoise Hildesheimer, *Guidelines for the Preparation of General Guides to National Archives: A RAMP Study* (Paris: UNESCO, 1983).

standardization efforts, sundry reference solutions are being adopted in a haphazard manner. Given the urgent needs of researchers, and the pressure to accommodate them, "quick fixes" with available computer components are understandably the order of the day. Many archives are quite aptly producing their own much-needed guides or short handbooks listing all fonds, including those recently declassified. Regrettably, Rosarkhiv information system planners have yet to adopt an adequate new format for standardized component rubrics that (with the advice of working archivists and experienced researchers) could later be incorporated into a comprehensive archival information system. In the most recent guides and those currently under way for central federal-level archives (almost all of them with foreign publication sponsorship), every archive appears to be going its own separate way.

For optimal researcher access in most large central archives, serious archivists and researchers alike recognize that basic guides need to identify first all fonds (with an indication of the extent to which they are declassified). Equally important, especially in central archives, in the case of large fonds with varying internal structure and not always clearly indicated series division is the identification of all the opisi (internal inventories) within each fond—at least in terms of dates and types, range, or subagency contents. Researchers also need to be aware of any extant previous opisi and any other available related internal finding aids, such as card catalogs, agency histories, or survey descriptions covering all or part of the records involved.¹³⁶ Previously, Glavar-

khiv never sanctioned guides that revealed the formal structure of fonds and their organization into opisi. Those were the days when many opisi themselves were classified, and when foreigners were rarely permitted to see any opisi at all. Now, under Rosarkhiv, archives are required to open opisi to researcher access and, where possible, house them in the main reading room. Thus there is a new urgency to provide brief annotated lists of all opisi (including those still classified) within fonds having more than two or three, so that researchers can easily determine for themselves which opisi might be needed, while simultaneously saving time and reference explanations for overburdened archivists.

Ironically, the first government archive to prepare a guide with identification of opisi within fonds was one of the previously most restrictive archives, namely, the Archive of Russian Foreign Policy (AVPR) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This guide has recently been published—albeit *only* in a microfiche edition from the original typescript—by an American firm.¹³⁷ Although its *opis*'-level descriptions are

all of the numbered file units, serves both as an internal inventory and structural division within every fond. It serves not only as a finding aid for researchers but as an essential component of administrative control for the archives themselves. In Russia, traditional archival regulations prevent the communication of any files to researchers in fonds for which accurate opisi have not been prepared, but since separate opisi were often prepared for classified portions of fonds, and fonds rearranged in the process, declassification now further complicates reference access through appropriate opisi.

¹³⁷ *Putevoditel' po fondam Arkhiva vnesheinei politiki Rossii*, compiled by M. A. Borusevich, I. V. Budnik, Iu. V. Nikolaeva, et al., 5 parts (Moscow: Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, 1988–1992; typescript. Microfiche edition: Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Publications, 1992). See the Grimsted review of this guide and discussion of the problems involved in comparison to recent Glavarkhiv guides in "Intellectual Access," 55–67. I am grateful to AVPR for making a review copy of the first part of this guide available to me several years ago, when it was first completed, and acquainting me with others on recent visits.

¹³⁶ See more details about Russian archival arrangement and descriptive traditions in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *A Handbook for Archival Research in the USSR* (Washington, D.C.: Kennan Institute for Advanced Studies/International Research & Exchanges Board, 1989), chapter 2. In the Russian system of archival arrangement, the obligatory *opis*'s, which lists

relatively primitive (without formal lists), it nonetheless contrasts favorably with all previous guides produced by state archives under Glavarkhiv. Relatively minor efforts would be required to raise its descriptive content and presentation to meet more definitive publication standards.

During 1992 under Roskomarkhiv, RTsKhIDNI (the former Central Party Archive) was proving a model for other archives in the production of a computer-generated short directory with separate listing of every opis' in every fond, including those with still classified files. A relatively simple computer database system with output to word-processing files has greatly speeded production. Publication in a new "Russian Archive Series," initially sponsored by the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, is scheduled for October 1993. The guide is being published in Moscow, with an introduction in English as well as Russian, and with added English annotations for fonds of Western origin.¹³⁸ In addition to opisi, related internal reference aids, such as available card catalogs that might otherwise escape the researcher's attention, are listed for each fond, and the availability of microform copies is noted. The computerized production system developed by RTsKhIDNI could well be a model for other archives, although some refinements would be in order to make it more compatible with international reference standards. The system has also given RTsKhIDNI an on-line administrative control of all its fonds.

Other guides in the American-sponsored

Russian Archive Series are being prepared for the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF, formerly TsGAOR SSSR and TsGA RSFSR) and for the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE, formerly TsGANKh SSSR).¹³⁹ The new short guides for GA RF, although they now list all of the newly declassified fonds, continue the format used for abbreviated guides to component archives issued under Glavarkhiv without opis'-level listings, rather than the more detailed RTsKhIDNI model.¹⁴⁰ Plans for the more detailed new RGAE guide call for more precise data regarding the creating agencies and the structure of all fondy, to the opis' level. This should be a considerable improvement over the last TsGANKh guide published in 1973.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ American coordinators are Professors Jeffrey Burds (University of Rochester), William Chase (University of Pittsburgh), Gregory Freeze (Brandeis University), and J. Arch Getty (University of California, Riverside). On the Russian side, coordination for the series is in collaboration with the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow.

¹⁴⁰ Two volumes were announced for GA RF to be published in 1993—one for the prerevolutionary division of the former TsGAOR SSSR (formerly TsGIAM), and a second for the former TsGA RSFSR, but these are also delayed in press. See the earlier guides to TsGAOR SSSR and TsGA RSFSR: *Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii, vysshikh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti i organov gosudarstvennogo upravleniia SSSR. Spravochnik*, compiled by L. G. Aronov, M. E. Golostenov, A. V. Dobrovskaia, et al., vol. 1 (*Dorevoliutsionnyi period*) and vol. 2 (*Sovetskii period*) (Moscow: Glavarkhiv, TsGAOR SSSR, 1990); and *Tsentral'noi gosudarstvennoi arkhiva RSFSR. Kratkii spravochnik*, edited by N. P. Eroshkin, et al. (Moscow: Glavarkhiv, 1973).

¹⁴¹ See the earlier classified guide compiled by E. P. Butskaia, N. M. Kleman, M. E. Kucherenko, et al., *Kratkii spravochnik fondov Tsentral'nogo gosudarstvennogo arkhiva narodnogo khoziaistva CCCP*, edited by M. E. Kucherenko, S. V. Prasolova, V. V. Tsaplin (*otvetstvennyi redaktor*), and N. D. Shulevich (Moscow: Glavarkhiv, 1973). A guide to many of the most important fonds in RGAE (formerly TsGANKh) completed by the archive in 1990 but never published (now available to researchers in typescript), provides functionally oriented lists of opisi and is being used as a basis for the second part of the new guide: "Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR. Fondy organizatsii. Spravochnik—(Funktional'no-proizvodstvennaia kharakteristika

¹³⁸ *Kratkii putevoditel'. Fondy i kollektsii, sobrannye Tsentral'nyim partiinym arkhivom* [A Short Guide Fonds and Collections Collected by the Central Party Archive], edited by J. A. Getty and V. P. Kozlov (Moscow: 1993; distributed in the United States by the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh). I am grateful to RTsKhIDNI editors for acquainting me with their computer system and the proof versions of their guide, on which my comments are based.

The first volume of a new four-volume guide to the Russian State Archive of Early Acts (RGADA, formerly TsGADA) finally appeared in the summer of 1991, and a second volume with American subsidy, in 1993.¹⁴² Over two decades in preparation, this is a more detailed traditional guide than those being produced by other central archives. The new guide shows more serious attention to agency histories than its predecessors, but again the lack of opis' references and/or indication of opis' divisions within the annotations for individual fonds is the most serious drawback.

New guides are also now available for the former all-union central state army and naval archives for the Soviet period, both of which were published in America. The first of the two-volume Russian-language guide to the Russian State Military Archive (formerly TsGASA) was released in the fall of 1991, with impressive agency histories and cross-references to subsequent parts of fonds presently held in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO); the second volume appeared early in 1993.¹⁴³ The less satisfactory 1991 Glavarkhiv-produced "short directory" of fonds for the

Soviet period held by the Russian State Archive of the Navy (formerly TsGAVMF) is being issued only in microfiche.¹⁴⁴

Most significant in terms of earlier reference work on the opis' level is the annotated register of opis produced by the Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA, formerly TsGIA SSSR) in St. Petersburg.¹⁴⁵ The three-volume typescript, prepared in the 1960s, covering the over 8,500 opis within fonds, is a model reference aid that deserves emulation throughout Russia, but for many years this crucial internal finding aid was not normally available to the public. As far as is known, similar reference aids of this quality were not prepared in other archives, so the task of describing opis will be more difficult. Regrettably, the most recent new guide for RGIA announced over a year ago (but still not available) was not planned to include these opis'-level listings. Work started at RGIA in early 1992 to transfer this register of opis to a computer database system, but the program designed is even more primi-

fondov I i II kategorii," edited by V. V. Tsaplin, N. V. Asatrian, M. A. Bakaleinik, et al. (Moscow: TsGANKh SSSR, 1990; typescript).

¹⁴² *Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov SSSR. Putevoditel', v chetyrekh tomakh*, vol. 1, compiled by M. V. Babich, Iu. M. Eskin, E. F. Zhe-lokhovtseva, et al. and edited by M. I. Avtokratova, N. P. Eroshkin, S. M. Dushinov, et al. (Moscow: Glavarkhiv SSSR, 1991); vol. 2 (Moscow, 1992). The second volume actually appeared in 1993, sponsored by Oriental Research Partners (Newtonville, Mass.), but it still bears the old name of the archive and a Glavarkhiv copyright. See a more detailed review of the first volume of this guide in Grimsted, "Intellectual Access," 63-65. The University of Pittsburgh first announced exclusive distribution in the West for the RGADA guide series, but now the guide is being sponsored by Oriental Research Partners.

¹⁴³ *Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Sovetskoi Armii. Putevoditel' v 2-x tomakh*, vol. 1 (Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Publications, 1991-93). Even in Moscow, unfortunately, the guide can be purchased only for dollars.

¹⁴⁴ *Spravochnik po fondam Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota*, compiled by M. E. Maleninskaia and I. Iu. Efremova (microfiche edition from the TsGAVMF typescript: Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Press, 1991). The guide was produced as output from the VNIIDAD personal computer system, although an English-language preface, partial index, and table of contents have been added. The microfiche edition is advertised in the United States for the high price of \$89.

¹⁴⁵ *Annotirovannyi reestr opisei [Tsentral'nogo gosudarstvennoi istoricheskoi arkhiva SSSR]*, 3 vols. (Leningrad, 1973; 490 p.). The TsGIA reference achievement was not widely known, although a report was prepared soon after its completion for an all-union reference symposium in 1975: R. Iu. Matskina, "Annotirovannyi reestr opisei kak promezhutochnoe zveno mezhdu putevoditelem i opisiami i ego mesto v sisteme nauchno-spravochnogo apparata," *Materialy k vsesoiuznomu soveshchaniu-seminaru po probleme "Nauchnye osnovy i perspektivy razvitiia nauchno-spravochnogo apparata (NSA) k dokumentam Gosudarstvennogo arkhivnogo fonda SSSR (GAF SSSR)"* (Moscow: Glavarkhiv, 1975; rotaprint), 99-108. See further discussion of this problem in Grimsted, "Intellectual Access," 96-103. My comments are based on discussion over the years with RGIA reference specialists.

tive than the one used for the RTsKhIDNI guide. Hence the resulting product, now being sold by the archive, has not resulted in a satisfactory reference work. It is to be hoped that the system can be improved and augmented to produce publishable output.

The recent situation wherein individual archives are having to rely on Western sponsorship for the publication of basic guides is an entirely new development, but one that will ensure their circulation in the West, undoubtedly (because of costs) even more widely than in Russia. Given high publication costs in Russia in recent decades and the lack of earlier Glavarkhiv funding priority for reference publications, few guides produced by central and regional archives since the 1950s were distributed abroad. Hence for immediate reference necessity, particularly given the increased interest abroad, it would make sense to reissue earlier guides systematically in microfiche format—including typescript ones and with typescript supplements covering recently declassified fonds. Such a project has been proposed as a continuation of earlier collections of published finding aids for Russian archives issued by a Dutch microform publisher.¹⁴⁶ This would serve a vital public reference function in Russia as well, at least as an interim measure until subsidies are available for new printed guides or a computerized reference system. Further plans call for copies to be deposited in archival reference centers in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and elsewhere as funds become

available. It is to be hoped that such a plan can be brought to fruition on a national scale, covering finding aids for archives and other manuscript repositories under all agencies.

Going down to the next, more-detailed level of reference aids, Russian archivists are formulating plans to prepare microform copies of opisi in major archives on a trial basis, as long advised by a number of specialists both in Russia and abroad. (For ease of reference use, it is to be hoped that microfiche will be used for opisi rather than microfilm.) As mentioned above, microfilming opisi is now planned as the first stage of the Hoover/Chadwyck-Healey project for the former CPSU archives (RTsKhIDNI and TsKhSD), as well as related twentieth-century fonds from the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF, formerly TsGAOR SSSR). If this plan is realized, and if the opisi so filmed are to be distributed for sale and intelligible to researchers, they will need to be systematically correlated with guides containing annotated lists of opisi for every fond, such as the RTsKhIDNI model mentioned above. Such guides, as an essential component in the public reference system, would serve as a vital link between fond-level description and the microform opisi, and at the same time would well serve researchers in providing an initial orientation to the unpublished opisi within the archive itself. It is to be hoped that appropriate models and computer methodology for the production of guides can be developed in a few such key archives on the federative level, so that the system could then be applied elsewhere, as resources become available, including in the all-important provincial-level state and former Party archives.

Coordination and methodological standardization in ongoing reference ventures is becoming a high priority for Russian archives, as reference specialists in the State Archival Service are beginning to recognize. Freedom from the centralized command-administrative system that earlier

¹⁴⁶ Inter Documentation Company already has issued three major collections, correlated with bibliographic listings in the Grimsted archival directory series: *Archives and Manuscript Collections in the USSR: Finding Aids on Microfiche*, edited by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, ed., series 1: *Moscow and Leningrad* (Zug, Switzerland: IDC, 1976; the correlation table for the microfiche editions was also printed in the separate 1976 IDC-published Supplement 1); series 2: *Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belorussia* (Zug, Switzerland: IDC, 1981); and series 3: *Ukraine and Moldavia* (Leiden: IDC, 1988).

operated under Glavarkhiv may be a blessing for many archives and archivists. From a reference standpoint, however, the new lack of centralized control, and the tendency for individual archives to find their own "quick fixes" in difficult economic times, will not necessarily produce an effective national reference system. As Russian archivists realize, further coordination and the development of effective descriptive standards for international communication are becoming more and more necessary as Russian archives take their

place in the world arena. It will take time and considerable financial resources to remedy the effects of the long decades of Russian isolation from the West and of earlier authoritarian and ideological restraints on access to information. But given the achievements of the first year and a half after the attempted August coup, there is cause for hope in the fact that, despite the many persisting problems facing Russian archives, they are being made open to research to an extent few would have dreamed possible earlier.